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LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION:
BATH IRON WORKS'S BOLD NEW
APPROACH
I.

INTRODUCTION

An increasing number of employers and unions have found
that the best way to compete in the marketplace and secure
both profits for the firm and good jobs for workers is through
cooperative worker-management relations. As Americans obtain more education, and with the changing nature of some
work, employers increasingly find it appropriate to rearrange
responsibilities and tasks to employees, who work sometimes
as teams and other times as individuals. For their part, more
highly educated employees express greater desire to participate in workplace decisions and have the knowledge and competence to undertake more tasks at the workplace. It is
clearer now than in the past that creating value at the work1
place is the joint responsibility of management and labor.
To compete in the world market, Bath Iron Works must
change. We must expand our vision to look at the big picture,
instead of focusing on just a small piece of the world. In order
to achieve the significant improvements necessary to better
our performance on naval contracts, as well as enable us to
enter into the commercial/industrial market, we must develop
a rational plan that allows us to be the most efficient and competitive manufacturing organization in the world.
On September 5, 1994, Labor Day, President Clinton addressed
the nation from Bath Iron Works (BIW) in Bath, Maine.3 The purpose of his visit was to hail, as a national model for workplace cooperation, the recently signed collective bargaining agreement4 (the
agreement) between BIW's management and workers represented
by Local S/6 of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America (IUMSWA)/International Association of Ma1. COMM'N ON THE FUTrrURE OF WORKER-MANAGFMENT RELATIONS,U.S. DF"T
OF LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2-3 (1994)
[hereinafter DUNLOP COMM'N FINAL

RECOMMENDATIONS].

2. BATH IRON WORKS CORP. AND THE INDUS. UNION OF MARINE AND SHIPBUILDING WORKERS OF AMERICA/INT'L ASS'N OF MACHINISTS, 1994 LABOR NEGoTIATIONS THROUGH JOINT TEAMING

23 (1994) [hereinafter BIW

AoREEMENT].

3. Remarks on Labor Day in Bath, Maine, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1735

(Sept. 5,1994). BIW is Maine's largest private employer. The 109-year-old shipyard
provides 8800 jobs for Maine workers. BIV competes with other shipyards in the

United States for contracts to build destroyers for the Navy.
4. Steve Campbell, Clinton PraisesBIWVfor Teamwork, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 6, 1994, at 1A.
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chinists (IAM) (Local S/6 or union).' President Clinton was joined
on the podium by labor leaders from the American Federation of

Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and union
representatives from the IUMSWA/IAM, and management from

Bath Iron Works. Government, organized labor, and American
business joined together to demonstrate to the nation the possibilities for creating a new American workplace. The separate interests
represented on the stage symbolized both the history and the future

direction of labor management relations at BIW and the potential
that exists for unionized workplaces across America.
The economic necessities that led to the signing of this historic
agreement are not limited to the shipbuilding industry. To meet
mounting domestic and foreign competition, many American businesses are employing cooperative efforts and employee participation plans in their workplace. In an attempt to improve quality,
productivity, and competitiveness, many American enterprises are

realizing that employee input into management decision-making
concerning quality and productivity is a beneficial step towards remaining competitive. Many American businesses understand that
the dominant current system of work organization, where the interests of the employer and employee remain separate and employee

initiative is stifled by hierarchical levels of authority and supervision, only serves to inhibit worker initiative and is detrimental to
worker morale and self-esteem.
In his Labor Day speech, President Clinton declared that "[w]e

cannot afford in a global economy to be divided again, Government
and business and workers fighting each other all the time, people in
this country finding ways to get in fights with each other instead of
ways to pull together and make this country great again. '' 6 The division to which President Clinton referred has been a dominant characteristic of labor relations in the United States for the better part of
the twentieth century. The National Labor Relations Act7 (NLRA

5. Local S/6, BIW's largest union, represents about 5300 shipbuilders, including
welders, pipe fitters and carpenters. Candace Lawson, BIW 'Teaming' Replaces
Conflict, TIMES RECORD, July 20, 1994, at 14.
6. Remarks on Labor Day in Bath, Maine, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1735
(Sept. 5, 1994).
7. The current version of the National Labor Relations Act is a result of three
amendments to the original Act. In 1935 Congress passed the Wagner Act, the original National Labor Relations Act, which gave workers the right to organize unions
and to bargain collectively with their employers. Ch. 372 § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §3 151-187 (1982)). The NLRA was amended in
1947 by the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Amendments). Ch.
120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). In 1959 Congress further amended the NLRA when
it passed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin
Amendments). Pub. L. No. 86-257, 33 701 (b), 703, 73 Stat. 519 (1959). Attorney
Thomas J. Schneider, in an address given at the Kennedy School of Government,
traced the development of the NLRA as follows:
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or Act), the nation's principal labor law, is the legal framework for
collective bargaining that relies on the separation of labor and management to achieve a system of arm's length negotiation.
The Act's approach to labor relations often has been referred to
as an adversarial model. This adversarial model views labor and
management as separate entities with inherently antagonistic interests. Labor law experts suggest that federal laws may be perpetuating this adversarial relationship and stifling cooperative efforts
between labor and management. The adversarial premise may have
been justified in the socioeconomic circumstances of 1935, but critics
claim that it is outdated for today's competitive global economy and
is ill-suited to assist American businesses to compete. Whereas the
concerns of labor and management were once seen as inherently in
conflict, today, the argument runs, their concerns are coalescing.
Both labor and management share an interest in the preservation of
jobs through increased productivity and competitiveness.
The basic environment for American businesses and workers has
changed dramatically since the time the NLRA was passed. Today
the nation finds itself confronted with declining productivity, increased foreign and domestic competition, and reports of worker
The Wagner Act of 1935 [was] intended to foster industrial peace by promoting equality of bargaining power between employees and employers
and by diminishing the causes of labor disputes, in particular union recognition disputes. The Act viewed employees' self organization and collective bargaining as essential conditions to industrial peace and considered
employer interference with and obstruction of such activity to be the principal evils to be checked. The law did not at all restrict or regulate union
activities. Thus, at this stage in time, in the 1930's, the government intended to encourage unionization and collective bargaining activities.
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 sought to promote industrial peace and
restore an equilibrium in labor-management relations by abandoning the
policy of affirmatively encouraging collective bargaining. Congress concluded that the rapid growth of the unions in the late 30s and early 40s and
the spread of collective bargaining had destroyed the equality of economic
power. Not only was a neutral stance toward collective bargaining
adopted, but union activity was regulated and restricted much as employers' activities had been under the Wagner Act. For example, union discrimination against an employee regarding union membership, refusal to
bargain collectively with an employer, secondary boycotts. and recognition
picketing were made unfair labor practices. In addition, collective bargaining agreements become legally enforceable contracts.
Finally, the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 sought to further balance the
power of the two sides. It also intended to protect the rights of individual
union members by regulating internal union activities. Thus, labor peace
was thought to be benefited by a free and fair struggle between labor and
management at the bargaining table.
Thomas J. Schneider, Quality of Working Life and the Law, Address in the Harmen
Lecture Series at the Kennedy School of Government and Public Policy (November
19, 1981), reprinted in Stephen I. Schlossberg and Steven M.Fetter, U.S. Labor Law
and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 37 LaB. LJ. 595. at 599-600
(1986).
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dissatisfaction.8 The American workplace, in addition, "has become

the central institution in American society" and "the centerpiece of

the nation's economic performance." 9 In today's global economy

"the quality of the workplace affects not only the individual enterprise and its employees, but also national economic growth and productivity performance." 10 In response to these challenges, many
American businesses have experimented with cooperative workplace governance and employee participation programs." These

programs are often geared toward increasing productivity and competitiveness by allowing workers to assist management in addressing
workplace problems and involving the workers in management decision-making. Many of these cooperative plans, however, face legal
challenges and can result in adverse consequences for workers
under current American labor law.

The changing face of the U.S. economy and workforce has
brought the issue of labor-management relations to the forefront of
the public policy arena. On March 24, 1993, Secretary of Labor
Robert B. Reich and Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown announced the creation of The Commission on the Future of Worker-

Management Relations (the Commission or Dunlop Commission).' 2

With the goal of improving the nation's productivity and living standards, the Commission was designed to study how workers and
managers could work together more effectively by taking on new
and often shared responsibilities.' 3
8. Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the AdversarialModel in Labor Relations:
An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE LJ.2021, 2021 (1987) [hereinafter Rethinking the Adversarial Model].
9. DUNLOP COMM'N FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 1.
10. Id.
11. Workplace cooperative programs are not new to the U.S. economy. While
they became very popular in the 1970s, one historian has dated their existence to the
early 19th century. Henry P. Guzda, Industrial Democracy: Made in the U.S.A.,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1984, at 26. For a brief description of more recent history of employee participation efforts, see COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF COM.,
FACr FINDING REPORT 47-48 [hereinafter DUNLOP COMM'N FACT FINDING REP.].
One recent and celebrated cooperative effort was that of the Saturn-GM facility that
entered into a cooperative agreement with the United Auto Workers. Stephen I.
Schlossberg and Steven M. Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor.Management Cooperation, 37 LAB. LJ.595 (1986).
12. Notice of the establishment of the Commission as well as notice of the first
meeting on May 24, 1993, was published in the FederalRegister of May 7, 1993. The
Commission is to serve solely as an advisory body in accordance with the Federal
Advisory Committee Act. DUNLOP COMM'N FACT FINDING REP., supra note 11, at
xi. The Commission is often referred to as the Dunlop Commission in honor of its
Chairman, former Secretary of Labor, John T. Dunlop.
13. Id. The Mission Statement of the Commission states: "The future living standards of our nation's people, as well as the competitiveness of the United States,
depend largely on the one national resource uniquely rooted within our borders:
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The Commission was to investigate and make recommendations

concerning the current state of worker-management relations in the
United States. In particular, the Commission was to address the
existence and need for greater workplace cooperation and to iden-

tify the legal impediments to cooperation that exist under current

U.S. labor law.14 The Commission released its Fact Finding Report
in May of 1994.15 The final report with recommendations was issued on January 9, 1995.16
In its final report, the Commission urged American lawmakers,
workers, and business leaders to find common ground, to develop

an American workplace that is less adversarial, more cooperative,
and more productive. The Commission declared:
It is time to turn down the decibel count, the adversarial and
hostility quotient that all too often mars discussion of workermanagement relations.... We must develop institutions and
practices that will allow employees and firms to cooperate at
the workplace in ways that will contribute optimally to economic growth and competitive performance and to the fulfillment of social norms.
our people-their education and skills, and their capabilities to work together productively." Id.(quotations omitted).
14. The Commission was to report back to the Secretaries of Labor and Commerce regarding these specific questions:
1. What (if any) new methods or institutions should be encouraged, or
required, to enhance work-place productivity through labor-management
cooperation and employee participation?
2. What (if any) changes should be made in the present legal framework
and practices of collective bargaining to enhance cooperative behavior, improve productivity, and reduce conflict and delay?
3. What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent to which
work-place problems are directly resolved by the parties themselves, rather
than through recourse to state and federal courts and government regulatory bodies?
I& (quotations omitted).
15. Prior to release of the Fact Finding Report, the Commission held 11 national
hearings in Washington, D.C., and working parties of three to five Commission
members held hearings in six communities-Louisville, East Lansing, Boston, Atlanta, San Jose and Houston. A total of 134 persons testified before the Commission
in its 11 hearings in Washington, D.C., and 220 persons testified in the six regional
hearings (a total of 354 witnesses). The transcripts of the 11 national Commission
hearings run to 2125 pages, and the transcripts of the six regional hearings run to
1733 pages (a total of 3858 pages). The Commission also received numerous exhibits, letters, papers, articles, and studies that have been included in its public record.
DUNLOP COMM'N FACt FINDING REP., supra note 11, at xii.
16. The Commission held four additional hearings in Washington, D.C., following
the issuance of the Fact Finding Report, bringing the total number of hearings to 21.
Fifty-seven persons testified before the Commission in these four additional hearings, bringing the total number of witnesses to 411 in the twenty-one public hearings.
The transcripts of the four additional hearings totaled 823 pages, bringing the total
number of pages for all the public hearings to 4681. DUNLOP COMMN'N FINAL REC.
OMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at x-xi.
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The workplaces that we have inherited are far too adversarial in tone and substance for the good of the American
economy. Changes must be made in the way firms, employees, and unions interact, and in workplace laws and regulations, to enable them to carry out successfully the vital tasks
that society places on them.,
President Clinton traveled to Bath, Maine, on Labor Day to tell
the nation of a success story in American labor relations. The BIW
agreement represents a true departure from the adversarial model
of labor relations and signifies a genuine partnership between labor
and management towards mutual goals and shared concerns. The
agreement proceeds upon the premise of cooperation, joint decision-making, and radical restructuring of production techniques.
The agreement empowers workers to become part of the enterprise,
to use their decision-making capabilities, and to do more than
"check their brains at the door."
The BIW agreement was worthy of the national exposure it received that Labor Day. BIW's cooperative collective bargaining
agreement represents a clear departure from the adversarial model
of labor relations provided for in the NLRA. That national exposure, however, draws attention to a serious flaw in the way the National Labor Relations Act governs the employer-employee
relationship. The NLRA, with its rigid separation of labor and management, did not envision BIW's type of cooperative relationship
between management and unionized labor. As a result, legal uncertainties surround the BIW agreement's implementation. Beyond
the NLRA's impediments to unionized cooperation lies a second
problem as well. Unlike BIW, the majority of American workers
has chosen not to be represented by a union."' The cooperative
techniques adopted at BIW were the result of a collective bargaining agreement, the terms of which were negotiated by management
and labor. In the great majority of American workplaces employing
cooperative techniques, however, there is no union to represent the
aggregate desires of the workers. In non-union workplaces, cooperative techniques such as those employed at BIW are often found to
be in violation of the Act. As a result some cooperative workplace
relationships have been ordered halted by court order, while others
operate in a status of legal uncertainty.
The NLRA was drafted with a unionized workforce in mind.
With the steady decline of unionism in America, the Act's rigid
framework for collective bargaining maintains significant barriers to
17. Id. at 3-4.
18. The Dunlop Commission reported that in 1993, 11.2 percent of private sector
nonagricultural workers were unionized. In the 1950s that number was approximately 35 percent. By contrast, the Commission reported that "over a third of public sector workers were union members in 1993, compared with 10 to 11 percent in
the 1950s." DUNLOP COMM'N FACT FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 24.
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cooperation in the non-union majority of American workplaces.
Reevaluation of the NLRA to allow for greater workplace coopera-

tion regardless of a union's presence is necessary."9 American labor

law must adapt to accommodate a better educated workforce, one

that desires more input on the job. If management is willing to cooperate with workers and share their decision-making responsibilities, American labor law should encourage that undertaking.
Congress must reexamine the adversarial premise of the NLRA in

light of changing industrial realities.
This Comment examines the changing environment of the American workplace and the existing labor laws that impede cooperative
efforts in both union and non-union workplaces. The BV agreement serves as a framework to analyze the need for change in the
20
law governing workplace cooperation.
Part II of this Comment presents the legal and historical foundations of the National Labor Relations Act and discusses the framework for collective bargaining that led to the entrenchment of the
adversarial model. Part III discusses the changing nature of the
American economy and workforce that has led to the reevaluation

of America's labor laws. Part III also discusses the general movement toward, and specific examples of, cooperative management

and employee participation programs that have been employed in
American workplaces throughout the country. The findings of the
Dunlop Commission concerning these issues are discussed in detail.
19. This Comment examines a very limited portion of the NLRA. Reevaluation
of the Act by Congress, on the other hand, should encompass examination of a
much broader range of provisions contained in the NLRA. The Dunlop Commission, for example, examined the process of establishing the collective bargaining relationship in American workplaces. The Commission concluded that union
"[riepresentation elections as currently constituted are a highly conflictual activity
for workers, unions, and firms. This means that many new collective bargaining relationships start off in an environment that is highly adversarial." Id. at 79. Accordingly, the Commission recommended "several revisions in the laws governing the
representation process [that] will render employee decisions about whether to engage in collective bargaining simpler, more timely, and less conflictual, thus making
this institution more accessible to those employees who want it." DUNLOP CONI1t'N
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 18. For examples of specific recommendations proposed by the Commission, see infra note 90. Discussion of these aspects
of the Commission report are beyond the scope of this Comment. The Author
would like, however, to emphasize his support for the right of workers to choose
union representation, free from employer abuses and coercion, if that is what they
desire. Analysis of the Commission's recommendations regarding collective bargaining and union representation elections would be a very interesting topic for further discussion.
20. When considering the BIW agreement it is important to keep in mind that
BIW is a unionized plant. Some of the following discussion does not distinguish
between unionized and non-unionized settings. When this distinction becomes significant to the discussion, however, effort has been made to point this distinction
out, particularly as it relates to the BIW experience.
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Part IV of this Comment identifies and analyzes specific provisions of the NLRA that obstruct workplace cooperative efforts.
This part discusses the structural and judicially created impediments
to cooperation that are found in sections 8(a)(2) 2 and 8(d) 2 2 of the
NLRA, as well as the Act's exclusion of supervisors and managers
from the ranks of organized labor. Discussion of these sections includes analysis of opinions by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board), United States Courts of Appeals, and the United
States Supreme Court, with the recommendation of the Dunlop
Commission provided where applicable.
Section V of this Comment discusses the particular experience at
BIW and analyzes BIW's recently signed collective bargaining
agreement between management and workers represented by Local
S/6. Discussion of the agreement includes a description of the collective bargaining process, the teaming concept, the committee
structure employed, and the alteration in production techniques
provided for in the agreement. Again, the findings and recommendations of the Dunlop Commission and the recommendations of the
AFL-CIO serve as guidelines for this discussion.
Section VI provides legal analysis of the BIW agreement in light
of the relevant sections of the NLRA earlier identified as traditional
impediments to labor-management cooperation. This Comment argues that the BIW agreement may be violating current labor laws
and, therefore, that reformation of these laws is needed to allow for
this sort of cooperation. In particular, the agreement reflects the
pressing need to clarify the definitions of workers, supervisors, and
managers, so that the Act's protections may extended to these
groups. The questions that exist as to the legality of the BIW agreement, although arising in a union setting, highlight the need to
amend section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA to allow for greater employee
participation in non-union firms as well. This must be done while
protecting workers' rights to choose an outside labor organization if
they desire. Employee participation committees cannot compete
with unions for employee representation. This Comment argues
that section 8(a)(2) is the proper provision in which to address this
issue and this Comment presents an argument in favor of legislation
currently pending in the U.S. Congress. Lastly, Section VI of this
Comment concludes by encouraging labor and management to learn
from the BIW agreement, to change their traditional confrontational mindsets, and to embrace cooperation as a mutually beneficial alternative.

21. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
22. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).

1995]

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

425

H. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Act: AN ADVERSARIAL
MODEL

Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, our nation's
principal law dealing with labor-management relations, to prevent
the industrial strife23 and economic violence that threatened the
American economy following the Depression. Congress perceived
such "economic warfare"' 4 to be the result of the "economic inequality between management and labor."' In order to address the
violence and ameliorate this perceived inequality, the Act established an institutional framework for arm's-length bargaining in
which representatives of labor would articulate employees' aggregate needs to management.2 6 In particular, the Act guaranteed

three specific rights to workers: 1) the right to organize; 2) the right
to bargain collectively; and 3) the right to engage in concerted activity such as peaceful strikes and picketing. 7
With the passage of the NLRA, it became the official policy of the
United States Government to encourage collective bargaining and

to protect workers' rights to be represented by a labor organization

of their own choosing. 28 Collective bargaining refers to a process in
23. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935) ("The first objective of the
bill is to promote industrial peace."), reprinted in 2 NLRB. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 2300 (1985) [hereinafter 2
NLRB, LEG. HIsT.].
24. See 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB. LEGISLATIvE
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT. 1935, at 22,24 (1985) [hereinafter 1 NLRB, LEG. Hisr.]. (Senator Wagner introduced the legislation as designed
to address the "sharp outbreaks of economic warfare in various parts of the country
25. Thomas T. Crouch, Note, The Viability of Distinguishing Betveen Mandatory
and Permissive Subjects of Bargainingin a Cooperative Setting: In Search of Industrial Peace, 41 VAND. L. REv. 577, 581 (1988) [hereinafter In Search of Industrial
Peace] (citing Hearingson S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-43 (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB LEG. HtsT., supra note
24, at 1373, 1410-1419 (1985) (statement of Sen. Wagner)).
26. See Note, Collective Bargainingas an IndustrialSystem: An Argument Against
JudicialRevision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARv. L
REv. 1662, 1679 (1983) [hereinafter Collective Bargaining].
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). These rights are often referred to as "Section 7"
rights. Section 7 of the NLRA provides, in pertinent part: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section 1 of the NLRA provides, in pertinent
part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and
to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-or-
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which an employer meets and negotiates with an employee representative as to conditions of employment and workplace-related issues. The NLRA guarantees the rights of workers to organize and
to choose an independent labor organization (or union) to represent
their interests to the employer. The purpose of the Act was to provide unions with a "limited, statutorily defined role, large enough to
encompass the bulk of labor unrest, and substitutes whenever possible the market mechanisms of arm's-length collective bargaining for
29
physical force and direct coercion.
The collective bargaining model treats management and labor as
autonomous entities engaging in a quasi-contractual relationship. 30
The Act provides only for bargaining process, not outcomes. The
parties, not the NLRA, determine the substance of any agreement
they reach.31 In order to maintain the freedom of private enterprise 32 and to respect the legal capacity of each autonomous party to
contract, 33 the Act neither provides for substantive review of contractual terms nor mandates that any particular agreement be
reached.34
The collective bargaining model relies on the strict separation of
management and labor. The idea is that each side will represent its
own interests at the bargaining table. Due to the inherently authoritarian nature of the employer-employee relationship, the concerns
of the two sides are often in conflict. Management and labor, in
effect, approach the bargaining table as "separate factions in warring camps." 35 The idea of management and labor as inherent adversaries is rooted in the turbulent history of the Wagner Act and is
perpetuated by an enforced labor-management dichotomy. 36 The
result, not surprisingly, has been "the development of an adversarial
ganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.
Id.
29. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 26, at 1674 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at 1674-75.
31. Id.
32. See In Search of IndustrialPeace, supra note 25, at 581.
33. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 26, at 1675.
34. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). See also 79 CONO. REc. 7660
(1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEG. HIst., supra note 23, at 2373. Senator Walsh,
Chairman of the Senate Labor Committee stated:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to
the door of their employer and say, "Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees." What happens behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to second-guess labor-management
agreements.
35. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
36. See Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2042.
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culture in American labor-management relations."3 7 As one commentator has suggested:
The term "adversarial model" is used to describe a system in
which management and labor maintain a strict separation, and
approach collective bargaining as competing entities with opposing interests, involved in a struggle over limited resources.
Because the basic premise of this system is that the parties'
interests inherently conflict, the parties rarely consider the
possibility that cooperation might benefit them both.This view was clearly espoused by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Insurance Agents, Int'l Union.39 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority of the Court, stated that labor and management "still proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and
concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached the ideal of
the philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people
4
would lead to perfect agreement among them on values." u
This difference in values is a basic assumption of the adversarial
model and of the Act itself. The adversarial model is seen as a direct result of the industrial anarchy that led to enactment of the legislation 4 ' and as a natural consequence of the authoritarian nature
of the employment relationship. Within this relationship, it is argued, conflict is inevitable and natural. As one commentator has
argued:
[B]etween employer and employed inherent conflicts of interest exist which are a function of the authoritarian nature of the
employment relationship itself. Further assumed is the idea
that employees will be able to gain, protect and further recognition of their peculiar interests and goals only through formation of autonomous group that can act to check management's
inherent power. Since a conflict of interests is regarded as inherent to the employment relationship, the use of economic
pressure is seen as having a legitimate and appropriate role in
the parties' ordering process. Thus, in the collective bargaining model, conflict is viewed as a natural rather than a morbid
characteristic, and its expression through the strike, lockout
and the like is regarded as integral to a system that permits the
37. Id.
at 2022 n.7.
38. ld.

39. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
40. Id.at 488-89.
41. See generally Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8. at 2042 (Clarke

states that both management and labor bear equal responsibility for the adversarial
nature of labor relations in the United States. In particular, Clarke points out that
the history of labor in the U.S. has been marked by "a trade unionism that was
militant in organizing industry and establishing an adversary position in that work
setting.") (quoting Schrank, Are Unions an Anachronism?, HARV. Bus. REv.. Sept.Oct. 1979, at 110.) Clarke contends this adversarial posture may have been necessary to solidify worker support in the climate of the 1930s.).
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parties to seek their self-interest in establishing the order of
their relationship. These features of collective bargaining
42
have led to its characterization as an adversarial system.
The Act as it is judicially construed reinforces the adversarial culture of labor relations. First, the Act has been written and interpreted to make a clear distinction between "employees," who are
entitled to the Act's protections, and representatives of management, such as "supervisors" and "managers," who are not. This latter group has been interpreted to include any worker who uses his
or her discretion or makes decisions in the interest of the employer
or to further management policies. Supervisors and managers are
not protected by the Act and therefore may not join unions, bargain
collectively, or engage in concerted activity. Because supervisory
and management personnel implement policy and make discretionary decisions on behalf of owners, they are excluded from the Act's
protection. This assures that management functions, decisions, and
interests remain outside the employees' role in the dichotomy.
Second, the Act, through section 8(a)(2), impedes cooperation between management and labor by assuring that employers can play
no role in forming labor organizations or providing assistance to
them. Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it .... ,,4 The consequence of this language, and a related provision that defines a "labor organization, 44 has been to
call into question the legality of cooperative management-labor
committees that discuss and address issues concerning terms and
conditions of employment and other workplace related issues.
Lastly, section 8(d) of the Act limits the issues that management
and labor are required to bargain over to a short list of mandatory
subjects. Section 8(d) defines the required subjects of collective bargaining as "hours, wages, and other terms and conditions of employment., 45 The result of this provision has been to create a distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects of collective bargaining.
42. Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499, 515 (1986) (citations omitted).

43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). The statute also contains a proviso that reads:
"[An employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with
him during working hours without loss of time or pay." Id.
44. Section 2(5) of the Act, which is construed in unison with § 8(a)(2), defines a
"labor organization" as follows:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
45. 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1988). The provision reads, in pertinent part:

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

1995]

429

While both an employer and union are obligated to bargain over
mandatory terms, 46 no requirement exists relating to permissive
subjects. Although this provision does not legally prohibit the two
sides from discussing permissive subjects, "because of the adversarial nature of the interaction, the employer is unlikely to be willing
7
to discuss other 'permissive' subjects that concern workers.- 4 This
mandatory-permissive distinction further serves to separate the domains of the two sides and has proven a significant impediment to
cooperation.
The Act does not require that management and labor treat one
another as adversaries in every aspect of the workplace. Cooperative workplaces and employee participation plans have become
prevalent throughout the American economy. Many exist, however,
in a state of legal uncertainty. While the adversarial bargaining
model does not mandate that labor and management remain in perpetual conflict, however, neither does it encourage or tolerate meaningful cooperation. In a world of competitive global markets and a
changing labor market and economy, the country can ill afford to
allow labor laws to detract from America's efforts to adapt and compete. The specific provisions of the NLRA previously outlined are
discussed in detail in Section IV of this Comment and an argument
is presented in favor of legal change. The folloving Section describes how the changing nature of the American labor market has
led to the reevaluation of existing labor laws. It details the increased popularity and success of cooperative workplaces that currently exist in the American economy.
Ill.

THE CHANGING AMERICAN LABOR MARKET AND THE

MOVEMENT TOWARD COOPERATION: FINDINGS OF THE
DUNLOP COMMISSION

Against this legal and historical backdrop of the NLRA, the
Dunlop Commission investigated the existence and need for greater
labor-management cooperation in the American workplace. In particular, the Commission was to answer the following question:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
id.
46. The Act imposes a duty of good faith bargaining upon both the employer and
the representative of the employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1988), respectively.
47. See Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2043.
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"What (if any) new methods or institutions should be encouraged,

or required, to enhance work-place productivity through labor-man-

agement cooperation and employee participation?" 4 8 The Commis-

sion found that "[t]he American economy, the workforce and jobs,
the technology at workplaces, the competitive context of enter-

prises, and the regulations of employment have changed" significantly since the time our primary laws governing labor-management
relations were passed.49 These economic and social changes have

posed significant problems and challenges to certain aspects of es48. See DUNLOP COMM'N FACr FINDING REP., supra note 11, at xi.
49. Id. at 1. The Commission identified 25 critical factors in the American labor
market that have affected American workers and posed challenges to the U.S. economy and traditional labor-management relations. These 25 factors are:
1) A long-term decline in the rate of productivity; 2) An increased globalization of economic life, reflected in trade and capital flows, and immigration; 3) Increased competitiveness of U.S. firms in the international
marketplace in the late 1980s and early 1990s, due to changes in unit labor
costs and exchange rates; 4) Changes in the work performed due to changing technology; 5) A shift in employment to service-producing sectors from
goods-producing sectors; 6) A shift in the occupational structure of the
workplace toward white collar jobs that require considerable education; 7)
Millions of establishments and firms of different sizes, whose workplace
practices and outcomes differ depending in part on the number of employees; 8) Turbulence in many product and financial markets due to deregulation and changes in government cutbacks in defense or other programs; 9)
A higher proportion of Americans working than ever before, due in large
part to the movement of women into the work force; 10) An increased
minority share of the workforce; 11) Increased years of schooling by the
workforce; 12) A changed age structure of the workforce as the "baby
boom" generation ages; 13) An increased flow of immigrants from developing countries into the United States; 14) Substantial creation of jobs but
high unemployment for the less skilled and considerable insecurity about
jobs; 15) Stagnant real hour compensation, with falling real compensation
for male workers; 16) A rising gap in earnings between higher paid and
more educated or skilled workers and lower paid and less skilled workers;
17) A growing number of low wage fully employed workers whose living
standards fall below those of low wage workers in other advanced countries; 18) Annual hours of work that exceed those in other advanced countries except for Japan; 19) A declining gap in earnings of men and women,
but stagnation in the gap between non-white and white workers; 20) A
growing number of jobs that diverge from full-time continuing positions
with a single employer; 21) A large growing population for whom illegal
activity is more attractive than legitimate work; 22) Stagnant rates of occupational injury and illness and increased workdays lost per full-time
worker, with increased workers' compensation costs; 23) A decline in the
prevalence of collective bargaining; 24) Fewer strikes or lockouts; and 25)
Increased government regulation of the workplace.
Id at 26-27. The principal laws governing workplace organization are the Railway
Labor Act (1926), the Wagner Act (1935), the Taft-Hartley Act (1947), and the Landrum-Griffin Act (1959). Other major laws from this period include the Social Security Act (1935), the federal-state system of unemployment insurance, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act (1938). Id. at 1 n.1.
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tablished worker-management relations and have resulted in certain
adverse job-market outcomes for American workers."0
These changes, in turn, have forced many American workplaces
to alter certain traditional methods of labor-management relations
and to experiment with cooperative organizational principles."' Externalities in the American economy and workforce are "interacting

with a growing recognition that achieving a high productivity/high
wage economy requires changing traditional methods of labor-man-

agement relations and the organization of work in ways that more
fully develop and utilize the skills, knowledge, and motivation of the
workforce."' Since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic increase in
the number and variety of workplace cooperative efforts in both unionized and non-unionized worksites.5 3 These cooperative arrange-

ments take many different forms. Each, however, leads to greater
worker input into management decision-making and requires more
personal interaction between management and labor.'
The Dunlop Commission reported growing support for workplace
cooperative efforts among U.S. workers, labor leaders, and business
managers. 55 Based on survey data and direct testimony the Com-

mission found that "a majority of American workers want to have
opportunities to participate in decisions affecting their job, the organization of their work and their economic future.-5 6 For example,
the Commission reported an outside national survey documenting

that "84% of employees working for organizations without an employee involvement or participation program would like to partici-

pate in one if given the opportunity and 90% of those working in
enterprises with a plan responded that their company's program was

a 'good idea.'

"I

The Commission reported that the changing char-

acteristics of the American workforce suggest that workers' desire
50. Id. at 1.
51. Id. at 29.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8. at 2024.
55. See DUNLOP COMM'N FACT FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 30-34.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id. (citing Business Week and Sirota and Alper Associates, The 1985 National
Survey of Employee Attitudes, New York, Sirota and Alper, September 1985). The
Commission also reported that "other surveys of blue and white collar groups conducted in the early 1980's found similar results." For example, one study found that
over 80 percent of respondents expressed a "desire for a say about issues affecting
how they did their work, and about the quality of their work, and a majority indicated an interest in having a say about the handling of grievances or complaints, the
pace of work, and how technology is used on their jobs." The survey found that
white collar workers "expressed higher levels of interest in participation on all these
issues than blue collar workers." Id. citing THoMAs A. KOCHAN ErAL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 212 (1986). The Commission
also reported recent focus group interviews by the Princeton Survey Research
Center found that:
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for more involvement in the workplace has been "growing gradually
over time"5 8 and that a continued increase of interest should be ex-

pected in the future, "since interest in participation tends to rise
with education., 59 The Commission also reported, however, that

"[s]ome employees remain highly skeptical and fearful of cooperaof an intive programs developed by managers in the absence
60
dependent union to represent workers' interests."

Representatives of organized labor echo this concern for independent representation as a necessary prerequisite for true and
fair employee participation. Labor leaders, the Commission reported, believe that the long-run objectives of employee participation should be to "enhance both enterprise competitiveness"' 61 and

"industrial democracy by providing employees a voice at all levels of

decision-making." '6 2 Union representatives believe, however, that

these goals are unlikely to be achieved unless the employees have an
independent source of representation in the form of a union to offset any imbalance of power created by a management-run cooperative plan.6 3

[H]ourly workers, professional and technical employees, and supervisors
consistently stated that among the things they value most in a job are variety, freedom to decide how to do their work without close supervision,
information and communication regarding things that affect their work and
their firm, and evidence that their employers seek, value and act on their
suggestions for improvement at their workplace.
Id at 31 (citing "Worker Representation and Participation Survey Focus Group Report," Princeton Survey Research Associates, Princeton, New Jersey, April 1994).
58. See DUNLOP COMM'N FAct FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 31.

59. Id To highlight this point, the Commission included the following commentator's observation: "[A] more educated work force-as ours has become-is simultaneously a more critical, questioning, and demanding work force, and a potentially
more frustrated one if expectations are not met." See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Work
in America, 107 DAEDALUS 54 (1978).
60. See DUoOP COMM'N FACr FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 31. The Commission included the following statement by Labor Notes, a publication of rank and
file union activists:
We have deep skepticism toward the notion that workers and management
have much in common in dealing with workplace problems. They compete
with each other to divide the economic pie, much as companies compete
for market share. The idea that they share interests has historically been
used to defeat or preempt unions....
Unions remain the only genuine independent employee organization capable of fighting for the interests of workers on the job.
See id. (citing Labor Notes, "The Independence of Labor," a paper submitted to the
Commission, October 1, 1993).
61. See id. at 34.
62. Id at 33.
63. Id at 34. The AFL-CIO report states:
Left to its own devices, management is most likely to continue to adhere to
the old ways of organizing work or to pursue work reorganizations which
leave the underlying power relationships unchanged and which offer the
appearance, but not the substance, of genuine worker involvement. It is
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Lastly, the Commission reported that a large number of business
managers support the idea of employee participation programs and
worker-management partnerships as essential to maintaining competitiveness in their particular markets and industries.' 4 For example, Bruce Carswell, Senior Vice President of GTE and Chairman of
the Labor Policy Association, testified:
The message that we would like to leave with you today is that
our nation can no longer afford to view the employment relationship as American workers and management competing
with one another in a zero-sum game. Instead, we need to
create a partnership among empowered employees, government, industry, and unions such that everyone is playing on
the same team in pursuit of mutually beneficial objectives.6
Thus, there appears to be a consensus on both sides that more cooperation is needed in the American workplace.
The Commission estimated that between one-fifth and one-third
of the American workforce is covered by some form of employee
participation program.' This figure includes a substantial majority
of larger American employers,6 7 and it is expected that the number
of participatory programs would be even greater if the surveys included as "employee participation" the more informal styles of communication found in many smaller American enterprises.' The
permanence and longevity of these employee participation programs are varied. 69 However, the Commission reported that those
most likely to be sustained over time "are ones in which the parties
broadent the scope of issues addressed, and integrate them with
human resource policies of the organization."7 In particular, those
arrangements combined with the presence of a union involved as a
71
joint partner with management were found most likely to survive.
There is no single dominant arrangement of participatory and cooperative schemes. Programs vary in form ranging from efforts originally designed to focus on productivity and quality improvement
unlikely in the extreme that such management-led programs of employee

involvement or "empowerment" can sustain themselves over the long term.

It is certain that such systems cannot meet the full range of needs of working men and women.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL OROANIZAnONS, THE NEW AMERICAN WoRKPLACE: A LABOR PERSPECvTIE, A REPORT BY

THE ComMITrEE ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORK

2 (1994) [hereinafter

AMERICAN WORKPLACE].
64. See DUNLOP COMM'N FACr FINDING RE'.,

supra note 11, at 32.

65. Id
66. Id at 36.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id
Id at 55.
Id at 36-37.
Id at 37.
Id

THE NEw
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issues to broader participatory efforts including self-managed work

teams, worker-management committees, partnerships, and employee ownership arrangements. 72 In addition, the Commission re-

ported that these labels are somewhat tenuous and artificial, since
programs often begin as one type or a combination of several and
change over time.7 3 The importance of these workplace schemes,
however, is that they all represent efforts to involve workers in the

overall operation of an enterprise for the simultaneous purposes of
improving productivity, competitiveness, and job satisfaction. A
brief description of the various organizational efforts documented
by the Commission provides a helpful basis for general understand-

ing and later discussion.
A.

Productionand Quality Centered Initiatives

Participation efforts that focus on quality and productivity improvements have become increasingly popular in United States industry. These organizations usually consist of teams comprised of
workers, supervisors, and managers "in ways designed to overcome
traditional status distinctions and job definitions. '74 In particular,
many firms have employed Total Quality Management (TQM)
processes that "encourage team members to explore root causes of

problems and alternative solutions that involve human resource
practices and policies. ' '75 Often these schemes begin with a focus on

productivity or quality improvement but go on to address other
workplace issues if they endure over time.76 As a result, the Com-

mission reported, "[I]t becomes increasingly difficult if not impossible to draw a line between production issues and employment
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id at 39.
75. Id. To illustrate the TQM process, the Commission reported on the practices
at the New United Motors Manufacturing operations (NUMMI) in California.
There team members are trained to use a six step problem-solving process that requires team members to explore potential root causes associated with, among other
things, "the way work is organized, how individuals perform their work, the staffing
and scheduling of activities, and other personnel and employment practices."
Toyota's manufacturing facilities in Kentucky have employed similar processes. Id.
at 38.
76. Id. at 44. The Commission reported on the efforts in Atlanta of Bell South
and representatives from the Communications Workers of America. There a quality
of working life program that carried over from the early 1980s later "embraced
TQM practices, and has evolved to the point where employees and workers meet
with key customers to demonstrate their commitment to total customer satisfaction." This program, the Commission reported, resembled nearly all the others described to the Commission as entailing "a strong commitment to training in
problem-solving, statistical methods, and related quality practices." Id. at 38.

1995]

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

435

practices, and among 'employees,' 'supervisors,' and 'managers' in
productivity and quality improvement efforts." 77

the most successful

Some of these arrangements, for example, will eventually address

a variety of terms and conditions of employment while others deal
78

with issues traditionally reserved to management and supervisors.
The line between communication and shared decision-making is
often difficult to draw in these various arrangements. 79 These organizational principles and outcomes are of legal significance. The
breaking down of traditional roles between employees and supervisory personnel may result in the loss of NLRA rights and protections for participating workers. The Act does not cover individuals

acting in a discretionary manner that aligns them with the interests
of management. Likewise, American labor law "attempts to draw a

distinction between processes that deal with production or quality
issues, and those that involve wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment, and between processes in which employees

communicate information to management versus those that involve
consultation, shared decision-making, and/or representation."'' The
discussion of terms and conditions of employment is legally reserved
for labor organizations that are independent from management.
Arrangements such as TQM's often disregard the enforced labormanagement dichotomy of the Act and are potentially illegal under

the NLRA.
B. Self-Managed Work Teams
"[S]elf-managed work teams take on duties and responsibilities
traditionally performed by supervisors and managers." 8' To illus77. 1l at 39. The Commission reported on the quality improvement teams of
Alliant Health Care Systems in Louisville. Alliant, the Commission reported. "relies heavily on use of temporary task force teams to solve specific problems that cut
across traditional functional and/or hierarchical groups." Id.at 38. Mr. Rodney
Wolford, former CEO of Alliant, described the personnel makeup and structure of
the task force as follows:
When it comes to specific projects or specific improvement efforts, those
are typically cross-functional teams made up of front-line workers, with
some involvement by management, and certainly a responsibility of management to monitor the process and to be involved to some degree. but not
necessarily to run the process.
Often-time those teams may even be chaired by front-line workers who
have undergone specific training to be able to manage the team process. In
terms of who goes on those teams, it's simply what makes sense representatives of all the various functions that may be involved or have some ownership accountability to any aspect of the process.
Id at 38.
78. Id.
79. Id.at 39.
80. ld at 37. For an explanation of the importance of these distinctions, see infra
Section IV.
81. DUNLOP COMIM'N FACt FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 40.
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trate this concept, the Commission reported on the practices of D.D.
Williamson and Company, a Louisville food processing manufacturer employing 105 persons. Ted Nixon, Chief Executive Officer of
D.D. Williamson and Company, testified:
We have eliminated all supervisory positions and we have
gone to self-managed work teams. Our Louisville plant runs
24 hours a day, five days per week. Shift leaders and teams
were chosen by the associated themselves in something similar
to a baseball draft. And team leaders rotate on a semi-annual
basis. Along with the increase in responsibility, there's an extensive training. For the most, associates can now do several
tasks ... [sic] The work teams are also responsible for their
own hiring and firing. We have some base education and personality screens that we use but after that 8the team does the
interviewing and the team does the hiring. 2
These types of arrangements, while giving the worker more discretion, input, and responsibility on the job, could result in the loss of
the NLRA protections if those workers are found to be supervisors
or managers under the Act.
C. Workplace Committees and Partnerships
The Commission reported a "variety of firms and labor organizations [that] described their [workplace] efforts as full-fledged partnerships and committee structures. '83 The heart of these workplace
schemes is that they require the input and cooperation of labor and
management towards mutual goals and shared concerns. Some
workplace committees and labor-management partnerships focus on
very specific topics, such as workplace health and safety,8 while
others address a broad range of employment and managerial issues.85 Of this latter type, the Commission reported on the efforts
of several firms and organizations including Ford Motor and the
United Auto Workers.8 6 The Ford-UAW initiatives are imple82. 1d at 39.
83. Id at 40.
84. The Commission reported that safety and health committees "[a]re among
the most longstanding and widespread types of issue specific committees found in
American workplaces." Id The Commission reported a 1993 survey by the National Safety Council that found the existence of such workplace safety and health
committees "in 75 percent of establishments with 50 or more employees and in 31
percent of establishments with less than 50 employees. This study also reported that
safety and health committees exist in 89 percent of unionized establishments and 56
percent of nonunion establishments." DUNLOP COMM'N FAcr FINDINO REP., supra
note 11, at 40 (citation omitted).
85. Id at 43.

86. The Commission also reported on the National Steel Company and the
United Steelworkers whose partnership has evolved to where union representatives
now sit on the Board of Directors of several steel companies. Id. at 41. The Commission also reported on the efforts of AT&T and the Communications Workers of
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mented on both a national and local scale and address matters of
mutual concern in such areas as "product quality, education and development, employee involvement, team structures, work redesign,
health and safety, ergonomics, employee assistance, apprenticeship,
and labor-management studies."' s The Commission reported similar structural efforts in both union and non-union settingss but concluded that the "[e]stablishment of enterprise-wide committees that
cover the full spectrum89of work-place issues are more prevalent in
unionized companies.
As discussed below in Section V the BIV collective bargaining
agreement establishes a joint partnership between management and
labor that employs a committee structure similar to that described
by the Dunlop Commission. At BIW the union is a full partner in
the enterprise. Committees have been formed consisting of both
management and labor, and the subjects discussed cover a broad
range of workplace issues. As this Comment contends, however,
America who described an integrated partnership they call the "Workplace of the
Future." This model is "built on extensive employee involvement and team systems
at the workplace, consultation at the business unit level where long term competitive
issues are discussed, and a corporate-wide human resource council that includes labor, management, and outside experts in discussion of long range plans." Id.
87. Id. at 58.
88. Id at 40-41. As an example of a non-union setting, the Commission reported
on the efforts of the Donnelly Corporation as follows:
[The Scanlon Plan] was introduced in 1952 ... in the late 1960s Donnelly
had worked with the Scanlon Plan for a fair amount of time but we really
introduced what we call the "Team Concept" in the late 1960s.... We also
started at that time trying to provide an alternative forum for due process
... the Equity Structure began in the late 1960s as basically an employees'
committee.... Now it's developed over time to a representative structure
to make sure that it satisfied two fundamental purposes. These representatives sit on committees, and we have sort of a hierarchy of committees.
Eventually, the top committee in this structure is the Donnelly committee,
which has 15 voting members, one of whom is president of the company.
So again, it is a diagonal slice; there are representatives from all different
section[s] of the company.
This structure has two fundamental purposes ... it provides a safety net
on issues of fairness, the whole issue of due process, grievance processing.
We also call it the issue resolution process, so I think that's a very interesting commonality there....
Also, we ask our equity structure to guarantee that people have a voice
in the development of policies that affect them and in fact, we ask our
Donnelly committee to unanimously agree on all personnel policies that we
put into place in the company.
Id. at 59. "Scanlon Plans," a technique designed by a steelworker named Joseph
Scanlon in the 1930s, involves the paying of bonuses to both managerial and nonsupervisory employees when productivity is increased. The plan is administered
through a joint worker-management committee that is made up of elected representatives from within a particular department. See generally Rethinking the Adversarial
Model, supra note 8, at 2025-26.
89. DUNLOP COMM'N FACT FINDING Rm,., supra note 11, at 43.

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:415

even the most cooperative workplaces, such as BIW, have the potential to run afoul of the NLRA.
The findings of the Dunlop Commission make it clear that both
management and labor support the idea of greater cooperation in
the American workplace and are taking steps to implement these
desires. These cooperative arrangements and employee participation plans are geared to making American businesses more competitive while providing greater job satisfaction and self-esteem for
American workers. The testimony presented to the Commission
supports the conclusion that these arrangements can be of benefit to
all parties involved. One concern expressed by organized labor,
however, is valid. Often such committees may be used by the employer as a union avoidance technique and can serve as puppet
groups dominated by the employer for the benefit of the employer.
American labor law must continue to protect against such abuses
but in doing so must not deter laudable efforts by American business and workers to improve the overall quality of work life and
economic competitiveness of their enterprise. The following section
discusses the specific provisions of the NLRA that have called into
question the legality of cooperative labor-management efforts and
that serve as legal impediments to a more cooperative American
workplace.
IV.

LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO LABOR MANAGEMENT
COOPERATION

It is against the backdrop of a changing economy and workforce
and a growing interest in and a recognition of the success of cooperative labor-management enterprises that the Dunlop Commission
sought to review and make recommendations concerning the nation's existing labor laws. In its final report the Commission refrained from proposing any explicit changes in existing statutory
language. Rather, the Commission made broad recommendations
aimed at promoting workplace cooperation. The Commission
stated:
We take an integrated approach to modernizing American labor and employment law and administration for the future.
Taken together, these recommendations give workers and
managers the tools and flexibility to do what they say they
want to do and are capable of doing to improve workplace
performance....
The evidence presented to the Commission is overwhelming
that employee participation and labor-management partnerships are good for workers, firms, and the national economy.
All parties want to encourage expansion and growth of these
developments. To do so requires removing the legal uncertainties affecting some forms of employee participation while
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safeguarding and strengthening employees' rights to choose
whether or not they wish to be represented at the workplace
by a union or professional organization.9'
A.

NLRA Sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5): An Employer's Illegal
Domination or Support of a Labor Organization

Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA has served as the most formidable
legal impediment to workplace cooperation and employee participation at the workplace. The provision makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it ... ."91 The interpretation and implementation
of this provision has called into question the legality of many of the
most innovative workplace cooperative and employee participation
90. See DUNLOP COMM'N FiNAL RECONMMENDATIONS, supra note 1. at xvi. In
considering the recommendations of the Dunlop Commission that follow, it is important to note that they were made in conjunction with other recommendations not
addressed in this Comment. The overall goal of the Commission's recommendations
was to examine and suggest changes to current labor laws that impede cooperation
and aid in creating an adversarial culture at the workplace. Many of the recommendations not discussed in this Comment deal with matters pertaining to the process
and procedures of union representation elections and first-time contract negotiations. These recommendations aim at expediting representation elections and upgrading mediation and arbitration in difficult first contract negotiations. Because
BIW is already unionized and the BIW agreement was not a first-time contract.
many of the recommendations and areas of the law addressed by the Commission
are beyond the scope of this Comment. However, if any of the Dunlop recommendations discussed in this Comment appear to be pro-management, they must be considered in light of the remainder of the Commission's study, which arguably is
designed to enhance labor's ability to organize. The following examples should suffice to put the recommendations the Author later discusses into proper perspective.
The Commission recommended:
1. Representation elections should be held before rather than after
legal hearings about issues such as the scope of the bargaining unit. The
elections should be conducted as promptly as administratively feasible, typically within two weeks.
2. The injunctions provided for in Section 10(l) of the Act should be
used to remedy discriminatory actions against employees that occur in organizing campaigns and first contract negotiations.
3. Employers and newly certified unions should be assisted in achieving
first contracts by a substantially upgraded dispute resolution program. The
program should feature mediation and a tripartite advisory board empowered to implement options ranging from self-help (strikes or lockouts) to
binding arbitration for the relatively few disputes that warrant it.
Id. at 18. For a discussion of the Commission's recommendations on Capitol Hill see
Prospects Uncertain for Implementing Dunlop Panel Report. Daily Lab., Rep.
(BNA), No. 19, at D-36 (Jan. 30, 1995). For a critical view of the Commission's
findings and recommendations, see The National Legal Center White Papers Reading
Between the Lines of the Dunlop Commission Report, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No.
172, at D-20 (Sept. 8, 1994).
91. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
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schemes. Section 2(5), in turn, defines a "labor organization" as
"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers

concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work."'
Section 8(a)(2) is viewed as the backbone of the NLRA. As pre-

viously discussed, the NLRA was passed in an effort to dissipate the
industrial strife that threatened the U.S. economy in the early 1930s.

The Act set up a framework for collective bargaining in which employees could organize collectively and be represented by an independent union to deal with an employer on an equal level of
bargaining strength. In this model the greatest threat to "the reali-

zation of this collective employee power" 93 was the establishment

and formation of internal, company-dominated unions. Often tak-

ing the form of employee participation committees, these company
or sham unions, it was argued, would be nothing more than puppet
groups for management, essentially dominated by employers for the
benefit of employers. 94 The primary goal of section 8(a)(2), by outlawing an employer's domination, interference, or assistance, was to
ban such company-dominated labor organizations.95 The effect of
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
93. See Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2023 (footnote

omitted).
94. Senator Wagner argued that "[clollective bargaining becomes a sham when
the employer sits on both sides of the table or pulls the strings behind the spokesman of those with whom he is dealing." See Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Sen.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor,74th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1935) (statement by Senator Wagner), reprintedin 1 NLRA LEG. HisT., supra note 24, at 1416-17.

95. In § 8(a)(2) Congress enacted a broad proscription of employer conduct. The
Report of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor provided some guidance
and examples on what would constitute unlawful conduct on the part of the
employer:
The so-called "company-union" features of the bill are designed to prevent
interference by employers with organizations of their workers that serve or
might serve as collective bargaining agencies. Such interference exists
when employers actively participate in framing the constitution or bylaws
of labor organizations; or when, by provisions in the constitution or by laws
[sic), changes in the structure of the organization cannot be made without
the consent of the employer. It exists when they participate in the internal
management or elections of a labor organization or when they supervise
the agenda or procedure of meetings. It is impossible to catalog all the
practices that might constitute interference, which may rest upon subtle but
conscious economic pressure exerted by virtue of the employment relationship. The question is one of fact in each case. And where several of these
interferences exist in combination, the employer may be said to dominate
the labor organization by overriding the will of the employees.
See SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, S. REP. No. 573, ON S. 1958, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEG. HisT., supra note 23, at 2309-10
(1985).
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this provision, however, has been to assure "the separation of the

parties that underlies the collective bargaining, or adversarial,
model. Under section 8(a)(2), an employee must choose either an
outside labor organization committed by law to the adversarial
model, or no representation at all."9 6 Section 8(a)(2), thus, leaves

little room for labor-management cooperation in the American
workplace. This is particularly true in non-union settings where an
employer's formation of and assistance to participation plans is
viewed as illegal domination or support.
1.

Newport News and Cabot Carbon

The Supreme Court's two major decisions interpreting the statu-

tory policies of sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) are NLRB v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock

Co.98

Co. 9 7

and NLRB v. Cabot Carbon

Taken together, these decisions exemplify how far-reaching

the language of the statute is in striking down even the most noble
of labor-management cooperative efforts. In Newport News the
Supreme Court invalidated an employer-assisted representation
plan in spite of evidence that the employees were satisfied and the

employer's motivations benign. In its prior proceedings the NLRB
had found a violation of section 8(a)(2) and ordered that the plan be
disestablished. 9 The Fourth Circuit, in reviewing the NLRB deci-

sion, refused to enforce the Board's order and concluded that the
Board should have focused on the apparent satisfaction of the par-

ticipants and the benevolent intentions of the employer. 00 In re-

versing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the clear

intention of section 8(a)(2) was to maintain a strict separation between management and labor and that employee satisfaction and

employer's motivations were irrelevant if this separation was not
maintained in the workplace. 1

1

96. See Rethinking The Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2022.
97. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
98. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
99. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 8 N.LLB. 866 (1938);
Rethinking the AdversarialModel, supra note 8, at 2027. "There are two types of
remedies for violations of section 8(a)(2). If the board finds that the employer has
dominated the organization, it will order that it be permanently shut down or 'disestablished.' In some cases where the Board has found that the employer has merely
supportedor interfered with the organization, it has ordered the employer to cease
and desist, while allowing the organization to affiliate with an outside union and
continue functioning." Id at 2027 n.32.
100. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 101 F.2d 841,
846-47 (4th Cir. 1939).
101. See NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241,
251. The Court stated:
The court below agreed with the respondent that, as the Committee had
operated to the apparent satisfaction of the employees.., it would be a
proper medium and one which the employer might continue to recognize
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In order to find that an employee committee has violated section
8(a)(2) of the Act, it is first necessary to determine whether the
committee is in fact a "labor organization" as defined by section
2(5) of the NLRA. According to this provision, an organization falls
within the definition if it exists for the purpose of "dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work."'" When interpreted
broadly, this provision has had the effect of including "employee
representation plans bearing no resemblance to conventional labor
unions, including arrangements lacking any formal, independent
structure."' 0 3 In Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB'

°

the Fifth Circuit

attempted to construe the provision narrowly, as requiring that to be
a "labor organization" an employee committee must actually engage
in "bargaining with" the employer.'" 5 The Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision and determined that section 2(5) implies

only that the employee committee "deal with" an employer, 10 6 requiring "a considerably lower level of contact than does bargaining
collectively."' 7 The Court stated that "Congress, by adopting the
broad term 'dealing' and rejecting the more limited term 'bargaining
collectively,' did not intend that the broad term 'dealing with'
should be limited to and mean only 'bargaining with' as held by the
for the adjustment of labor disputes. The difficulty with the position is that
the provisions of the statute preclude such a disposition of the case. The
law provides that an employe [sic] organization shall be free from interference or dominance by the employer.... In applying the statutory test of
independence it is immaterial ... that any company interference in the
administration of the plan had been incidental rather than fundamental
and with good motives. It was for Congress to determine whether, as a
matter of policy, such a plan should be permitted to continue in force. We
think the statute plainly evinces a contrary purpose, and that the Board's
conclusions are in accord with that purpose.
Id.; see also Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2027.
102. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
103. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 26, at 1669 (1983).
104. 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958).
105. Id. at 285. In Cabot Carbon, the Fifth Circuit had refused to enforce a
Board's disestablishment order. In the proceeding below, the Board had determined that the employee committee, which was set up to discuss grievances and
working conditions with the employer, constituted a labor organization under the
Act, and that the employer's support of it had therefore constituted violation of
§ 8(a)(2). See 117 N.L.R.B. 1633 (1957); see generally Rethinking the Adversarial
Model, supra note 8, at 2030. The Fifth Circuit, even while recognizing that the
organization was dominated by the employer, refused to enforce the Board's order,
holding that since the committees had not actually engaged in "bargaining with" the
employer, it did not constitute a labor organization under § 2(5) of the Act. See
Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F. 2d 281, 285; see generally Rethinking the AdversarialModel, supra note 8, at 2030.
106. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
107. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 26, at 1669.
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As one commentator has suggested,

"[U]nder the broad definition of 'labor organization' in section 2(5),
strict enforcement of section 8(a)(2) would rule out employer support for almost every imaginable kind of employee organization

short of an insurance plan, social club, or softball team.""09 The definition of labor organization is critical to section 8(a)(2) analysis. A
broad definition makes it more likely that cooperation will result in
an 8(a)(2) violation.
2. Reinterpretation:The Freedom of Choice Analysis
There has been considerable debate among courts and scholars as

to the original intent and contemporary relevance of sections 8(a)(2)

and 2(5) of the NLRA." ° This debate has centered around two critical and difficult issues: "(1) whether section 8(a)(2) prohibits cooperative labor-management representation plans with which

employees are satisfied, and (2) how broadly the term 'labor organization' should be read." ' While the Supreme Court seemed to
have provided answers to these questions in Newport News and
Cabot Carbon, several circuit courts' 2 have "chosen to ignore the
Supreme Court opinions, and have refused to enforce section
8(a)(2) where there is evidence of employee satisfaction with the

challenged organization.""' 3 This approach has commonly been referred to as the "freedom of choice" analysis. Unlike the approach

taken by the Supreme Court, which views the establishment of arm's
length collective bargaining as the goal of the Act and section
8(a)(2) as the protector of this system, freedom of choice propo-

nents view the goal of the Act as ensuring employees the freedom to
choose whether or not to be represented by an independent labor

organization. As long as the employees are happy with their choice,
no violation of section 8(a)(2) can exist. One commentator critical
of the freedom of choice approach summarized the differences as
follows:
108. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 211-12.
109. See Collective Bargaining, supra note 26, at 1669. See also Carborundum
Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 710, 715 n.9 (1941).
110. See DuNLop COMM'N FACr FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 53.
111. See Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2026.
112. Specifically, the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have adopted the
freedom of choice analysis. See e.g., NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d
535 (6th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979);
Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875
(1975); NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1968); Federal-Mogul
Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB. 379
F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957):
Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
113. Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2026.
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The National Labor Relations Board (Board) and many
courts have traditionally treated section 8(a)(2) as a blanket
proscription of any employer involvement in the formation or
administration of an employee representation plan. Their primary consideration in applying the section has been whether
the challenged organization is sufficiently autonomous to function as a bargaining representative. Thus, when the employer's support is critical in the establishment or
administration of a representation plan, and when a plan cannot be altered by the employees without the employer's consent, the arrangements have been held to violate section
8(a)(2).
Since the mid-1950s, however, several federal courts have
rejected this traditional interpretation. Treating section
8(a)(2) in isolation from the rest of the Act and neglecting the
importance of arm's-length collective bargaining in the Act as
a whole, these courts have seen the section as an obsolete restriction on management freedom. They have concluded that
non-union representation plans should be permitted when the
plans promote cooperative labor relations, and they have
groped toward a test of the legality of such arrangements that
relies on114an undifferentiated assessment of "employee free
choice."
The Seventh Circuit in the 1955 case of Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB" 5 was the first court to apply freedom of
choice analysis to an alleged section 8(a)(2) violation. The court,
although acknowledging the employer's involvement in the employee organization, refused to enforce the Board's disestablishment order and held that the involvement constituted
"cooperation," which is not prohibited by the Act, rather than "support," which the Act proscribes." 6 In distinguishing "cooperation"
from "support," the court reasoned that support, like domination,
involves "some degree of control or influence," whereas
"[c]ooperation only assists the employees or their bargaining repre7
sentative in carrying out their independent intention.""1 What was
a violation, the court held, was a showing of
required to make out
"actualdomination."'1 8 In so holding, "the court collapsed together
the statutory terms 'domination' and 'support' in order to distinguish a third kind of employer involvement, 'cooperation,' not men114. Collective Bargaining,supra note 26, at 1663-64 (citations omitted).
115. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). In Chicago Rawhide an employer and a group
of employees set up an "Employee Committee" to handle grievances. The employer
allowed the Committee to meet on company time. Id. at 166. After the employees
overwhelmingly rejected an outside union in a Board supervised election, the company voluntarily recognized the Committee as the employees' exclusive bargaining
representative. Id. at 167.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 168.
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tioned in the Act." 119 The court, in contrast to the Supreme Court's

rule in Newport News, 2 ' went on to consider the employees' satisfaction with their decision to be represented by the Committee1 21

and the employer's laudable motives." 2 The court concluded, "We
are not going to permit the destruction of a happy and cooperative

employer-employee relationship when there is absolutely no evi-

dence to support a finding of unfair labor practice."' 23 The court's
effort to construe the Act this way demonstrates the need for more
flexibility in the rules that are used to evaluate cooperative relation-

ships in the workplace.
3. Reinterpretation of a Section 2(5) Labor Organization

As an alternative to applying freedom of choice analysis, other
courts have construed the Act's definition of "labor organization" to

allow greater workplace cooperation. In the 1982 decision of NLRB

v. Streamway Division of Scott & Fetzer Co., 2 a the Sixth Circuit at-

tempted to reinterpret the definition of a "labor organization"
under section 2(5). In Streamway the employer established an inhouse representation committee, with rotating membership, that
was to address issues involving grievances and working conditions.
The Committee was to be ongoing and would meet with company

officials at regular intervals.1 5 The Committee in question closely
resembled the one struck down by the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon. To validate the Committee, however, the court gave the term
"labor organization" a very narrow construction and determined
119. Collective Bargaining,supra note 26, at 1665. The author further contends
that the court never "fully articulate[d] what kinds of protections, if any, were intended by § 8(a)(2), nor did it explain how it had determined the employees' 'independent intention.'" Id. at 1665-66 (citing Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB.
221 F.2d at 167).
120. See Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, in which the author

points out that only one of the free choice cases attempts to distinguish Newport
News. Id. at 2028 n.46. The other cases, see supra note 114, including Chicago Rawhide, ignore it altogether. Id at 2029 n.46. The author also points out that a 1984
Sixth Circuit opinion, NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 547 n.12 (6th
Cir. 1984), cited Newport News in a footnote and stated that the policy considerations that existed in 1939, the year Newport News was decided, had changed. Id.
The author agrees that policy considerations have changed but argues that "in a
question of statutory construction, the only issue which should concern the court is
whether the statute has changed." Rethinking the AdversarialModel, supra note 8, at

2029 n.46.
121. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d at 169.
122. Id. at 170 ("The acts complained of show only laudable cooperation with the
employees' organization.... [T]he Company was not intending, by permitting this
practice, to coerce or influence the employees' choice of a bargaining
representative.").
123. Id.
124. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
125. Id. at 289-90.
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that this Committee lacked the independent structure defined by

section 2(5) for a "labor organization."' 2 6 The court, conceding that

the Committee was dominated by the employer,12 7 determined that

the organization did not fit the section 2(5) requirements and therefore no violation of section 8(a)(2) could be found. The court stated
that "the adversarial model of labor relations is an anachronism"' 28
and that "at some point a literal translation of section 2(5) will frustrate the very purposes of the Act itself.' 1 29 Critics of the decision
claim that "the court based its conclusion in large part on its stated

policy of encouraging new, cooperative modes of labor relations"' 30

while ignoring the express language and overall intent of the statute.
4. Electromation, Inc.: Current Board Interpretation

In 1992 the NLRB handed down a major decision interpreting
sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) of the NLRA. The decision, Electroma-

tion, Inc.,131 firmly rejects the freedom of choice analysis employed

by several circuit courts. This case represents the Board's commit-

ment to the original spirit and intent of the NLRA. In Electromation the Board reemphasized the interpretations provided by the
Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon and Newport News and rejected
the narrower interpretations provided by freedom of choice proponents.132 This commitment to legislative intent and established pre-

cedent, however, had the immediate effect of disbanding a concrete
attempt by an American enterprise to cooperate with workers to the
mutual benefit of the parties involved. The broader implication of
this decision calls into question the legality of employee participa126. Id. at 291.
127. Id. The court stated:
We think there is little question that if it is a "labor organization" under
section 2(5) of the Act, the Committee was dominated by the Company. It
was expressly mandated by the Company, and the Company controlled its
composition and its meetings. Therefore, we think it follows that if the
Committee was in fact a labor organization, the Company was guilty of a
violation of section 8(a)(2).
128. Id. at 293.
129. Id. at 295.
130. Collective Bargaining,supra note 26, at 1670. The author goes on to state:
In its alacrity to uphold the legality of the committee, however, the court
failed to consider the contradiction implicit in its reasoning: it relied on
judicial reinterpretations of section 8(a)(2) to decide that no labor organization was present, but it also acknowledged "that if the Committee was in
fact a labor organization, the Company was guilty of a violation of section
8(a)(2)." In effect, the Streamway court reinterpreted the definitional section of the statute in light of its policy preferences but simultaneously conceded that section 8(a)(2) indicated the opposite result.
lId (citing NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d at 291).
131. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
132. Id. at 996.
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tion plans and worker management cooperative programs throughout the nation's economy.
In Electromation, Inc. the Board found unlawful the employer's
establishment of "action committees" designed for joint dealings
with management over absenteeism, no-smoking policies, and pay
progression plans.' 33 The Board ruled that the employer unlawfully
133. Electromation, located in Elkhart, Indiana, is a non-union manufacturer of
small electrical and electronic components for the automobile industry employing
about 200 people. Id. at 1016. In late 1988 management at Electromation concluded
that it was facing unacceptable financial losses and decided to reduce expenses by
modifying its employee attendance bonus policy, and provide a year-end lump-sum
payment to employees rather than give a wage increase. Id. at 990. Displeased with
these changes, sixty-eight employees petitioned the company's management. Id.
The company's president first met with the supervisors and decided that management would meet directly with the employees to discuss the problems. Id. Management then met with a selected group of eight employees and discussed with them
issues including wages, bonuses, incentive pay, attendance programs, and leave policy. Id. at 990-91. After this meeting the president concluded that the company had
a serious problem with its employees. The president testified that he concluded at
that time that "it was very unlikely that further unilateral management action to
resolve these problems was going to come anywhere near making everybody happy
... and we thought that the best course of action would be to involve the employees
in coming up with solutions to these issues." Id. at 991. The president testified that
management came up with the idea of "action committees" as a way to involve employees. Id. Upon hearing about the action committees, the workers initially were
"not positive." Id Yet after the president explained that because "the business was
in trouble financially ... we couldn't just put things back the way they were ... we
don't have better ideas at this point other than to sit down and work with you on
them," the workers agreed to the proposal. I. The employer then posted a memorandum announcing the creation of the committees, which were to consist of six
employees, one or two members of management, and the employer's Employees
Benefits Manager. A. Employee membership was determined by sign-up sheets.
The Action Committees included: (1) Absenteeism/Infractions, (2) No Smoking
Policy, (3) Communication Network, (4) Pay Progression for Premium Positions,
and (5) Attendance Bonus Program. Id. Management expected that the employee
committee members would talk with other employees in the plant, get their ideas.
and communicate with any employees who were interested in the issues. Id.
Shortly after the Committees began to meet, Teamsters Local 1049 made a demand to the company for recognition and filed an election petition with the NLRB's
Regional Director. Id. at 991, 1015. The union also filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Regional Director, alleging that Electromation's Action Committees
violated § 8(a)(2) and § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Id. at 1015. There was no evidence
that the employer was aware of the union's organizing effort until the union's demand for recognition. Id. at 991. At the next meeting of each action committee,
Electromation's committee coordinator informed the members that management
could no longer participate in the meetings but that the employees could continue to
meet if they desired. It The Absenteeism/Infraction and Communication Network
Committees decided to continue to meet; the Pay Progression Committee disbanded; and the Attendance Bonus Committee decided to write up a proposal that
the controller had approved and then disband. Id. at 991-92. The Committee never
submitted the proposal to the company's president because the union's election
campaign intervened. Id at 922. The Union lost the election 95 to 82. hi. at 1015.
The administrative law judge found that Electromation had violated both § 8(a)(2)
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dominated the committees by providing the idea to create the committees and by determining their structure and function."3 In addition the Board ruled that the employer unlawfully contributed

support to the committees by permitting the employees to carry out

committee activities on paid time.1 35 The Board, adhering to the

broad interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon, found the committees were in fact "labor organizations" under
section 2(5) because they dealt with the employer on issues regarding conditions of employment.' 36 Significantly, the Board rejected
the idea that anti-union animus or motive should be required in order to find unlawful domination under section 8(a)(2) 137 and
stressed that "a labor organization that is the creation of manage-

ment, whose structure and function are essentially determined by
management... and whose continued existence depends on the fiat

of management, is one whose formation or administration has been
dominated under section 8(a)(2)."' 3 s

The Board's decision prompted alarm in the business community.
American business leaders argued that the Electromation decision

would have the effect of finding most modem employee involve-

ment or employee participation programs illegal.' 39 On appeal to

the Seventh Circuit, numerous amici filed briefs both in opposition
to and in support of the Board's ruling. Briefs filed in opposition to

the decision urged the court to apply a freedom of choice analysis,
arguing that America's competitiveness in world markets depended

heavily on management's ability to create and support employee
participation programs. The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to
address the broader question of section 8(a)(2)'s impact on modem
day employee involvement programs. The Seventh Circuit, as had
the Board, adhered to legislative intent and to Supreme Court precedent and affirmed the Board's ruling. The court stated:
and § 8(a)(1) of the Act, ordered that the committees disband, and recommended
that the results of the recognition election be set aside. Id. at 1019.
134. Id.at 997-98.
135. Id. at 998.
136. Id. at 997. The Board rejected the idea that § 2(5) requires that the employees believe their organization to be a labor organization. Id. at 994. Instead, the
Board used a three-part test in its § 2(5) analysis. In this analysis a committee is a
labor organization under § 2(5) when: (1) the organization is one in which employees participate, (2) a purpose of the organization is to deal with employers, and (3)
the organization concerns itself with conditions of employment or other statutory
subjects contained in § 2(5). Id
137. Id. at 996.
138. Id. at 995.
139. But see Former NLRB Chairman Miller Calls Electromation Problem
"Myth," Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 201, at D-7 (Oct. 20, 1993). Former NLRB
chairman Miller argued that "[i]t is indeed possible to have effective [employee involvement] programs of this kind in both union and non-union companies without
the necessity of any change in the current law.., the 'so-called Electromation problem' is simply a 'myth.' "

1995]

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

449

In view of the wide variety of programs presented and described in the various amicus briefs filed before the Board and
this Court, the Board reasonably and properly declined to attempt to issue an opinion addressing all possible employee involvement programs. Rather, exercising its discretion to
construe the Act in light of the legislative history, applicable
Supreme Court precedent, and the underlying policies of the
Act, the Board found that the company's actions here fell
within the statutory proscriptions and did not implicate changing industrial realities that might be relevant to construction of
the statute in other circumstances.... Instead, it simply observed that it does not have latitude to change a particular
construction of the statute based on changing industrial realities where congressional intent to the contrary is absolutely
clear, or where the Supreme Court has decreed that a particular reading of the statute is 14
required,
or both. Nor was it nec0
essary to do so in this case.
The Board and Seventh Circuit decisions in Electromation, Inc.
emphasize that modification of sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) to meet today's economic challenges must come from the Congress and not
from the courts. The Electromation, Inc. decision did attract Congressional attention,' and several bills were introduced in Congress to overrule essentially the Board's decision.' 4
Unfortunately, Electromation was a bad vehicle for the Board to
use to make any real progress clarifying the law and promoting
workplace cooperation. The facts of Electromation, Inc. made it a
rather easy case in terms of Supreme Court precedent and statutory
intent: the committees were the idea of the employer, management
created and posted notice of the committees, and the employees in
the committees dealt with the employer over statutory issues. The
140. Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994).
141. See 138 CONG. REC. H2205 (daily ed. Apr. 1,1992) (statement of Rep. Gunderson) (noting that Electromation"will probably be one of the most important rulings ever" by the NLRB). See also 138 CONG. REC. H2206 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1992)
(statement of Rep. Ritter) (noting the second anniversary of the NLRB administrative lawjudge decision "that has put American competitiveness on ice."). See generally Michael L. Stokes, Note, Quality Circles or Company Unions? A Look at
Employee Involvement After Electromation and du Pont, 55 OHIo ST. LJ. 897, 909
n.64 (1994) [hereinafter Quality Circles or Company Unions?].
142. See S. 669, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (The "Teamwork for Employees
and Management Act of 1993" was introduced on March 30, 1993 by Sen. Nancy
Kassebaum (R-KS) to permit labor management cooperative efforts that allow
America's competitiveness to continue to thrive.); H.R. 1529, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (The "Teamwork for Employees and Management Act of 1993" was introduced in the House by Rep. Steven Gunderson (R-VI) on March 30 1993. The bill
would amend the NLRA to allow employers to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in an organization or entity in which employees participate to discuss matters of
mutual interest (including issues of quality, productivity, and efficiency) if such participation does not claim or seek authority to negotiate, enter into, or amend collective bargaining agreements.).
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decision was easy for the Board, but NLRB members, in filing separate opinions, confused rather than clarified the law. For example,

the Board gave some indications that legislative history and earlier
Board decisions may require that an employee group act in a truly
representational capacity to qualify as a labor organization, but the
members expressly declined to reach this issue.143 Allowing the
higher standard would assure that committees created by management would not violate sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) if they merely

"dealt with" rather than "bargained with" the employer. This standard also would serve the purpose of ensuring the employees' au-

tonomy when it comes to representation as to bargainable issues.
5. Recommendations of the Dunlop Commission

The Dunlop Commission views workplace cooperation and employee participation innovations as a legitimate means to enhancing
America's economic competitiveness. Accordingly, the Commission
was very concerned about the ramifications of the Electromation,

Inc. decision. Unfortunately, however, the Commission refused to
recommend any express statutory amendments, thus declining to re-

solve many of the semantic problems associated with section 2(5)
and section 8(a)(2) analysis. In its final report, the Commission did
recommend:
Clarifying the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and its
interpretation by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to insure nonunion employee participation programs
are not found to be unlawful simply because they involve discussion of "terms and conditions" of work or compensation as
long as such discussion is incidental to the broad purposes of
these programs. At the same time, the Commission reaffirms
the basic principle that these programs are not a substitute for
independent unions. The law should continue to make it illecompany dominated forms of emgal to set up or operate
44
ployee representation.
143. See Quality Circles or Company Unions?, supra note 141, at 911.
144. See DUNLOP COMM'N FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at xvii. This

recommendation, however, was not unanimously adopted by the Commission. One
member, Douglas A. Fraser, former President of United Auto Workers and current
Professor of Labor Studies at Wayne State University, filed a one page dissent. Mr.
Fraser stated, in part:
Section 8(a)(2) stands as a bulwark against forms of representation
which are inherently illegitimate because they deny workers the right to
voice through the independent representatives of their own choosing and
put the employer on "both sides of the table," ....
... Given the legal and factual uncertainties that exist as to the scope of
section 8(a)(2), and the danger that any statutorily-created exception
would be an invitation to abuse, at the very least the prudent course would
be to allow the administrative and judicial processes to address the issue of
"incidental discussion" in the first instance. If problems were to developif, in fact, the law in practice were shown to substantially interfere with
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This recommendation does not go far enough in ensuring that coop-

erative workplace efforts that work to the benefit of the parties involved are legal. The recommendation that the discussions be

"merely incidental" provides little guidance for courts when dealing
with the substantial fact-specific inquiry involved in the sections
8(a)(2) and 2(5) analysis. A better approach is that of the freedom
of choice analysis. Under that standard cooperative programs may
exist if they operate to the benefit and to the satisfaction of both
sides involved. Employees must be given the choice whether to be

represented by an outside labor organization. If they decline that
choice, uncoerced by management, the employer and his workers
should be allowed to enter into a mutually beneficial arrangement.
Unfortunately, as has been discussed, such an approach violates
Supreme Court precedent and violates the original intent of the

statute.
B.

The Supervisor and ManagerialExclusion

The enforcement of a strict dichotomy between labor and management has proven central to the Act's framework for collective
bargaining.145 "The Act's definitions of employee, employer, and

supervisor all assume a strict dichotomy between employees, who
1 46
are entitled to the Act's protections, and managers, who are not."

Although the Act expressly excludes supervisors from the Act's protections, the managerial exclusion was created by the Supreme
incidental discussions of terms of employment-Congress could then take
up the subject against a far clearer legal and factual background.
In no event, should employer-dominated employee representation plans
be permitted merely because they are limited to dealing with specified subjects such as safety and health or training. Employer-dominated representation is undemocratic regardless of the particular subjects with which the
employer-controlled representative deals.
...I wish to make clear that I do not minimize the value of encouraging
"employee participation" and "labor-management cooperation." But to
my mind, the kind of "participation" and "cooperation" that should be encouraged is democratic participation and cooperation between equals.
Id. at 14.
145. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 26, at 1677 ("It is critical to the industrial system embodied in the Act that there be a line between labor and management to serve as an axis for collective bargaining.").
146. Id. (footnotes omitted). The Act, in its definition of employee, provides in
pertinent part that "the term 'employee' shall include any employee.., but shall not
include any individual ... employed as a supervisor...." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
The Act defines a "supervisor" as
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire.
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id. § 152(11).
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Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace.147 The Court defined "managerial" employees as "executives who formulate and effectuate man-

agement policies by expressing and making operative decisions of
their employer. ...

"I

This discretionary function, performed in

furtherance of company policies, is viewed as beyond labor's role in
the dichotomy.1 49 The Court ruled that "'managerial employees'
are not covered by the Act,"' 5 0 and therefore are excluded from its
protections. In Bell Aerospace the Court created and applied this
managerial exemption to buyers of parts and materials.
In NLRB v. Yeshiva University'5 1 the Court greatly expanded the
scope of the managerial exclusion by holding that faculty members

of Yeshiva University could not form a union or bargain collectively
with their employer because professors were determined to be managerial. The Court ruled that professors, by voting on matters such
as curriculum, class size, and academic standards, "exercise author-

ity which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial."' 5 2 The Court reasoned that to decide otherwise "would

undermine the goal it purports to serve: To ensure that employees
who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer will
'
not divide their loyalty between employer and union."153

147. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The Court reasoned that, in addition to supervisors
who were explicitly excluded from the Act, "[t]he legislative history strongly suggests that there also were other employees, much higher in the managerial structure,
who were likewise regarded as so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary." Id at 283.
148. Id. at 286 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947)).
149. See Rethinking the AdversarialModel, supra note 8, at 2042.
150. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 289.
151. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
152. Id.at 686. The Court stated:
The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would
be managerial. Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to
whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods,
grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide
which students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion
their views have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be
charged, and the location of a school. When one considers the function of
a university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these.
To the extent the industrial analogy applies, the faculty determines within
each school the product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be
offered, and the customers who will be served.
Il
153. Id. at 687-88. The Court stated, "The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a university like Yeshiva, which depends on the professional judgment
of its faculty to formulate and apply crucial policies constrained only by necessarily
general institutional goals. The university requires faculty participation in governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation of academic policy." Id. at 689 (footnote omitted).
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In 1994 the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the vitality of the
management-labor dichotomy in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp." In ruling that certain nurses who performed supervisory functions were beyond the Act's protections, the Court held
that the Board's test for determining whether nurses are supervisors
under the Act was inconsistent with the statute. The Court ruled
that the Board had created a false dichotomy between acts taken "in
connection with patient care and acts taken in the interest of the

employer." Since patient care is a nursing home's business, the
Court reasoned, it follows that attending to the needs of patients,

who are employer's customers, is in the employer's interest. 55 This

decision is significant because the Board's "in the interest of the employer" test had been used to "separate out workers who direct

others based on superior skill, experience and the like from true supervisors-those whose main function is to direct the work of others
(or hire, fire, and so forth) for the employer." ' 6 In invalidating the
Board's test, the Court stated that "acts within the scope of employ-

ment or on the authorized business of the employer are in the interest of the employer."'"

The practical significance of these decisions may be far-reaching
for those employees who direct co-workers even incidentally.
Under Yeshiva these workers may be considered supervisors and denied protections of the Act.' 5 8 These decisions may have far-reach154. 114 S.Ct. 1778 (1994).
155. Id at 1782.
156. See DuNLOp COMM'N FINA. RECOMMENDATIONS. supra note 1, at 10.
157. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S.Ct at 1782 (citing Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1947)).
158. The Court stated that "[t]he National Labor Relations Act affords employees the rights to organize and to engage in collective bargaining free from employer
interference. The Act does not grant those rights to supervisory employees, however, so the statutory definition of supervisor becomes essential in determining
which employees are covered by the Act." Id. at 1780.
The Wagner Act of 1935 did not exempt supervisory employees from its coverage.
As a result, supervisory employees could organize as part of bargaining units and
negotiate with the employer. Employers had complained that this produced an imbalance between labor and management. The Court, however, refused to create
such an exception in the 1947 decision of Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.
485,490 (1947). The Court reasoned that any exceptions to the Act must be defined
by Congress. Later in that year, with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress
did in fact create this statutory exception. See NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp., 114 S.Ct. at 1780. The Packarddecision was a major factor in bringing about
the Taft-Hartley Act. Both the House Report and the Senate Report expressed concern over the Board's broad reading of the term "employee" to include those clearly
within the managerial hierarchy. The Senate Report specifically focused on the
warnings expressed in Justice Douglas' dissent. See S.Rep.No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 4 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGiSLATiVE HISTORY OF T E LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

Acr, 1947, 407, 409-11 (1985).

It was Justice Douglas's dissent in the Court's 1947 decision in Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), that became the intellectual underpinning for the
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ing consequences for workers under many of the cooperative
arrangements that exist in the U.S. economy. Many of these cooperative arrangements are designed purposefully to give employees
more managerial and supervisory tasks and to share in managerial
decision-making on the job. The Dunlop Commission reported that
some workplace programs "blur the traditional distinction between
supervisors or managers and workers, raising questions about the
coverage of employees under the NLRA."'15 9 If cooperation trans-

mutes employees into managers or supervisors, many workers will
be ineligible for the underlying protections of the Act. This is too
high a cost. Employees should not have to choose between section 7
rights and cooperation with management.

The Commission presented a possible solution. Recognizing that
Supreme Court decisions do not take into account "the degree to
which supervisory and managerial tasks have been diffused through-

out the workforce in many American firms,"'160 the Commission
recommended
updating the definitions of supervisor and manager to insure
that only those with full supervisory or managerial authority
and responsibility are excluded from coverage of the law. We
further recommend that no individual or group of individuals
should be excluded from coverage under the statute because
of participation in joint problem-solving teams, self-managing

Court's adherence to the management-labor dichotomy. In his famous dissent Justice Douglas lamented the breakdown of this dichotomy, warning that "management
and labor will become more of a solid phalanx than separate factions in warring
camps." I& at 494. Justice Douglas warned that
The present decision ... tends to obliterate the line between management and labor. It lends the sanctions of federal law to unionization at all
levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are not management and labor but the operating
group on the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on the
other. The industrial problem as so defined comes down to a contest over
a fair division of the gross receipts of industry between these two groups.
The struggle for control or power between management and labor becomes
secondary to a growing unity in their common demands on ownership.
... [I]f foremen are "employees" within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers,
superintendents, assistant superintendents-indeed, all who are on the
payroll of the company, including the president; all who are commonly referred to as the management .... If a union of vice-presidents applied for
recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do not see how we could
deny it and yet allow the present application.
... [I]f Congress, when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act, had
in mind such a basic change in industrial philosophy, it would have left
some clear and unmistakable trace of that purpose. But I find none.
Id. at 494-95.
159. See DuNLOP COMM'N FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note I, at 7.
160. Id. at 11.
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work groups, or internal self-governance or dispute resolution
processes."'
This recommendation is important in terms of employee participation programs. Employees reported greater job satisfaction and
higher self-esteem when they felt their ideas were sought on the job.
Higher workplace morale will undoubtedly lead to greater productivity and efficiency, which benefits both labor and management.
Furthermore, employers should seek ideas from those on the front
lines. America will be wasting a vital resource if it allows labor laws
to stifle worker initiative and creativity. Employees should be encouraged to take initiative on the job and to contribute ideas to the
betterment of the enterprise. The law should be clarified so that
employees who use their discretion and take initiative on the job do
not lose the protections afforded to them under the NLRA.
C.

The Mandatory/PermissiveDistinction

If workers choose to be represented by an outside labor organization, that outside labor organization becomes the exclusive representative of the workers for collective bargaining. The NLRA,
however, mandates only a limited number of subjects upon which
management and labor have a duty to bargain. Section 8(d) of the
Act imposes "the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."' 6 2 With the statute providing little guidance
as to what "terms and conditions of employment" are to be included
in such discussions, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
what it has labeled "mandatory" and "non-mandatory" (or permissive) subjects of collective bargaining." If an issue is determined to
be mandatory, the employer and union become obligated to bargain
about the subject, and each side may utilize the economic weapons
available to it under the NLRA to support its bargaining position.
If, on the other hand, a term is labeled as non-mandatory, neither
side is obligated to bargain about the issue. As to permissive subjects, "management may use its own discretion when acting within
permissive areas, without having to give any consideration to employee interests."' 6
As the law has evolved, the Court has engaged in balancing the
entrepreneurial ownership rights of the employer, "an employer's
need for unencumbered decisionmaking,"' 1 against the benefits to
161. Id. at xvii.
162. 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1988).
163. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-50

(1958).
164. In Search of IndustrialPeace, supra note 25, at 580.
165. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1980).
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labor-management relations that may be expected from mandating

a subject to the bargaining process. In FibreboardPaperProducts
Corp. v. NLRB' 66 the Court determined that management's deci-

sion to contract out work previously performed by employees in the
bargaining unit, a decision that resulted in the loss of jobs, was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The Court determined

that the contracting out of work was clearly a condition of employ-

ment 67 and that "issues relating to job security should be
"168 The Court reasoned that
mandatory subjects of bargaining ....
the statutory scope of colout'
within
of
'contracting
"inclusion
the

lective bargaining" was "well designed to effectuate the purposes of
the National Labor Relations Act... to promote the peaceful settle-

ment of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation."

69

Under the

facts presented, the contracting out of similar work to be done
under similar conditions, management's decision was viewed as par-

ticularly amenable to the collective bargaining process.
The majority was very careful to limit its holding to the exact facts

presented,170 but it was Justice Stewart's concurrence that truly
sought to define and limit its scope. Obviously disturbed by the

breadth of the decision, Justice Stewart emphatically declared that
there were certain management decisions "which lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control' 171 that should not be mandated to the pro379 U.S. 203 (1964).
Id. at 210.
In Search of IndustrialPeace, supra note 25, at 587.
379 U.S. at 210-11.
The Court stated:
We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to hold, as
we do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved in this case-the
replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an
independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of
employment-is a statutory subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d).
Our decision need not and does not encompass other forms of "contracting
out" or "subcontracting" which arise daily in our complex economy.
Id.at 215.
171. Id. at 223. Justice Stewart stated:
Many decisions made by management affect the job security of employees.
Decisions concerning the volume and kind of advertising expenditures,
product design, the manner of financing, and sales, all may bear upon the
security of the workers' jobs. Yet it is hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve "conditions of employment" that they must be negotiated
with the employees' bargaining representative . . . . Nothing the Court
holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily
about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be
necessarily to terminate employment.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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cess of collective bargaining." According to Stewart, management
decisions that are "fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate
enterprise"'173 must be left to the sole discretion of the business
owner. This was a matter of "traditional principles of a free enterprise economy."' 7 4
In the 1980 decision of First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB 175 the Supreme Court announced the modem judicial interpretation of the mandatory/permissive distinction. The Court determined that an employer's decision to shut down part of his
business
for purely economic reasons was not a term and condition of
mandatory bargaining under the NLRA. Adopting the rationale of
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Fibreboard,the Court concluded
that "[t]his decision, involving a change in the scope and direction of
the enterprise, is akin to the decision whether to be in business at
all, [and is] 'not in [itself] primarily about conditions of employment,
though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate
employment.' "176 The Court, while recognizing the union's interest
in protecting the jobs of its members, concluded that this decision
would not be benefited by the collective bargaining process and was
better suited to the entrepreneurial discretion of the business owner.
The Court held:
We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an employer's
need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part
of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's
participation in making the decision, and we hold that the decision itself is not part of section 8(d)'s "terms and conditions,"
..over which Congress has mandated bargaining.'7
The mandatory/permissive distinction perpetuates the adversarial
nature of labor management relations. Although the judicially created distinction does not bar the two sides from discussing all subjects, the traditional adversarial nature of their relationship often
leads to confrontation and an unwillingness to discuss all issues relevant to the workplace. In fact the balancing test proposed in First
172. Justice Stewart stated: "Viewed broadly, the question before us stirs large
issues. The Court purports to limit its decision to the 'facts of this case.' But the
Court's opinion radiates implications of such disturbing breadth that I am persuaded
to file this separate statement of my own views." Id. at 217-18. Justice Douglas and
Justice Harlan joined Justice Stewart's concurring opinion.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 226.
175. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
176. Id. at 677 (citing Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at
223) (Stewart, J., concurring). Cf Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263,
268 (1965) ("an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for
any reason he pleases").
177. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. at 686 (citations
omitted).
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National Maintenance has been criticized, as Justice Brennan did in
his dissent, "for balancing entrepreneurial freedom against a pro-

cess, labor-management relations, rather than against a genuine employee interest in workplace management."' 7 8 This entrepreneurial

discretion enables management to shut labor out of certain decisions
that affect the job security of the workers.
In a cooperative setting, however, the mandatory/permissive dis-

tinction becomes meaningless. The "distinctions drawn between
mandatory and permissive bargaining subjects.., have not only become hazy, but also, from a practical perspective, have become
meaningless, because the demarcations between the goals of both
labor and management purposefully have been removed."' 7 9 In

workplaces across America, management and labor are disregarding
this distinction and rejecting the traditional adversarial framework

of labor-management relations as envisioned in the NLRA. In this
178. In Search of Industrial Peace, supra note 25, at 592; James Friedman, Keeping Big Issues Off The Table: The Supreme Court on EntrepreneurialDiscretion and
the Duty to Bargain, 37 MF. L. REv. 223,259 (1985). In the case of Dubuque Packing Co. and United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 150-A, the NLRB formulated a new test for determining whether an employer's decision to relocate unit
work was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. See 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991).
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals approved the test. United Food & Commercial
Workers, Local 150-A v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Board presented
the test as follows:
Initially, the burden is on the General Counsel to establish that the employer's decision involved a relocation of unit work unaccompanied by a
basic change in the nature of the employer's operation. If the General
Counsel [is successful], he will have established prima facie that the employer's relocation decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining. At this
juncture, the employer may produce evidence rebutting the prima facie
case by establishing that the work performed at the new location varies
significantly from the work performed at the former plant, establishing that
the work performed at the former plant is to be discontinued entirely and
not moved to the new location, or establishing that the employer's decision
involves a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise. Alternatively, the employer may proffer a defense by showing, by a preponderance
of the evidence: (1) that labor costs (direct and/or indirect) were not a
factor in the decision or (2) that even if labor costs were a factor in the
decision, the union could not have offered labor cost concessions that could
have changed the employer's decision to relocate.
303 N.L.R.B. at 391. The D.C. Circuit Court explained that the Board's test concerns three distinct layers. "First, the test recognizes a category of decisions lying 'at
the core of entrepreneurial control' in which employers may unilaterally take action." 1 F.3d at 30 (citation omitted). This is an objective test that looks to the
differences between the employer's old and new operations. Second, the test applies
subjective scrutiny. The question here is whether labor costs played a role in the
employer's decision. Id Lastly, the test includes a futility provision that permits an
employer to relocate without negotiating where its union either would not or could
not offer sufficient concessions to change its decision. Id. The Supreme Court, after
having granted certiorari, see 114 S. Ct. 1395 (1994), dismissed the request for review. See 114 S. Ct. 2157 (1994).
179. In Search of IndustrialPeace, supra note 25, at 598.
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regard section 8(d) only impedes cooperation to the extent the parties allow it. Once the mindset is geared towards cooperation rather
than confrontation, a broader range of issues may be addressed at
the bargaining table, issues that are considered of mutual rather
than exclusive concern.
While section 8(d) may have its limitations, this provision of the
NLRA must remain intact. The entrepreneurial discretion of business must be protected. As Justice Stewart argued, this is a matter
of "traditional principles of a free enterprise economy."1 1s0 In an
adversarial climate of collective bargaining, section 8(d) may, in
fact, serve to perpetuate confrontation. If the parties in collective
bargaining wish to maintain separate interests and desire to treat the
other as an adversary, the issues they discuss will be limited. This
limitation, however, is a matter of choice. If, on the other hand,
management and labor choose to relinquish their traditional roles as
adversaries, a broader range of issues may be put on the table. If
management desires to include workers and organized labor in decisions concerning the scope and nature of the enterprise, section 8(d)
provides no barriers. This, however, must be a matter of choice, not
of Congressional or judicial mandate.

V. THE BIW

EXPERIENCE

The experience at BIW is part of the national movement toward
workplace cooperation described in the findings of the Dunlop
Commission. The BIW agreement is significant because it represents both a structural change in workplace operations and decisionmaking and a basic change in the traditional attitudes held by labor
and management. The BIW agreement received national attention
on Labor Day for good reason. The agreement represents a comprehensive attempt to improve the productivity and competitiveness
of the enterprise by involving the workers in the decisions that affect
their job security and the overall well-being of the enterprise. The
agreement exemplifies what is possible when the adversarial nature
of the management-labor relationship is changed to a relationship of
trust, cooperation, and mutual respect. This section discusses the
details of the BIW agreement in light of both the findings of the
Dunlop Commission and the recommendations of the AFL-CIO.
This section analyzes the significance of the agreement in terms of
the recommendations proposed for reformation of the American
workplace.

180. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 226 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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ChangingEconomy and Changing Attitudes

The Dunlop Commission reported that certain external forces in
the economy and the workforce were combining with internal
changes of attitude at the American workplace concerning the desire for more cooperation between labor and management. These
findings closely mirror the experiences at BIW that led to the signing of its historic collective bargaining agreement. The 1980s were1 81a
bad time for labor management relations at the Maine shipyard.
Relations between management at BIW and its largest union had
been adversarial and marked by a climate of distrust. In 1985 a bitter 100-day strike resulted at the yard when the two sides were unable to come to a contract agreement. In 1987 a comprehensive
inspection by the United States Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) resulted in the issuance of approximately 2000
violation citations and in fines totaling $2.4 million. The death of a
worker in 1989 provided yet another opportunity for labor and management to square off against one another.'82
To make matters worse, the government declared heavy reductions in defense spending. With the yard almost exclusively reliant
on defense contracts, reductions in defense expenditures represented a threat to the mutual interests of both labor and management. It became evident to both management and labor that
something needed to be done to save the company and the
thousands of jobs it provides for the State of Maine. As David
Libby, President of Local S/6, stated in a newspaper interview:
It didn't take too much to see the writing on the wall, to see
that if we didn't do something and BIW didn't do something,
then none of us would be working.
And the only way we're going to have those jobs is if BIW
has a good backlog of ships to build. If we can do something
to make that happen, I think it's as much
183our job as it is...
management's job to make that happen.
BIW decided to re-enter commercial shipbuilding, an industry
dominated by state-subsidized foreign firms." 4 The highly competitive nature of this industry forced BIW to reconsider its production
and decision-making techniques. An important opportunity for
change in labor management relations occurred when BIW Presi181. Duane Fitzgerald, Remarks at the University of Maine School of Law (Nov.
1994) (Duane (Buzz) Fitzgerald and David Libby, President of Local S/6 IUMSWA,
spoke to Prof. James Friedman's Labor Law class about the significance of the BIW
agreement).
182. Id.
183. James M. McCarthy, Working Together to Save Shipbuilding Jobs, THE
TiMES RECORD, March 2, 1994, at 15, 17.
184. Id. at 15.

1995]

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

461

dent Duane (Buzz) Fitzgerald asked George Kourpias, President of
the International Association of Machinist and Aerospace Workers,
to join an advisory panel that would seek a grant from the federal
government to study the production techniques of foreign firms.
This decision by BIW management represented the initial step in its
attempt to involve labor in important decisions affecting the scope
and nature of the enterprise.
With management and labor acting in cooperation, BIV successfully competed for a $4.5 million grant to study foreign shipbuilding
techniques in Japan and Finland."a The receipt of this grant was
significant for two reasons. First, it represented an effort by the
United States Government to assist firms committed to revitalizing
American competitiveness by addressing and altering traditional
norms of labor-management relations and the organizational and
production techniques that flow from such relationships. Second,
the cooperative processes involved in the joint labor-management
advisory committee represented an important change in attitudes at
the plant itself. This change was evident in the mindset of both
parties.
With the aid of the federal grant, management at BIW invited
labor leaders from the plant to join them abroad to study the foreign
shipyards. The idea was to allow both sides to learn from their foreign competitors and to incorporate the knowledge and expertise of
labor in the design of the product. Buzz Fitzgerald, in an interview
with the imes Record, discussed foreign production and the new
direction of BIW:
I think it starts all the way back in engineering. When they
[foreign yards] design a ship, their initial design and engineering work is done with productibility very much in mind.
I don't think we've done that in this country. Certainly not
in the combatant business: We tend to design the world's most
perfect ship and then hope like hell that someone can build it.
And we don't take into account the kinds of difficulties we're
imposing upon the workers ....
As it turns out, if you include the workers or someone that
is knowledgeable about how you actually have to do the work,
there's a whole lot of things we would design differently to
product, but
make things easier. We'd produce
1 6 the same end
it would be easier to get there.

185. Id.
186. James M. McCarthy, Updata"BIW's Five-Year Plan, THE TiMES REcoRD.
January 26, 1994, at 17.
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The Union's David Libby expressed similar sentiments and stressed
the emerging changes in attitude between the once adversarial parties. In an interview with the Times Record, Libby stated:
I think, first, one of the important things to note is that the
Machinists union was involved as part of the proposal to get
the $4.5 million grant from the government ....
And I think that was one of the big factors in Bath Iron
Works actually getting the grant to do this.
I think it's also important to say that five years ago, or even
three years ago, I don't believe BIW and this union would
have been involved in this kind of venture.
Some people think it's not a union's function to try to help
the company out ... [but] the most important issue to me is
jobs for my people, the people I represent-that they have
jobs five years from now, 10 years from now.
I also think it is important to have the union involved from
the beginning.
We were involved in the strategic planning meetings. I
don't think that anything was hidden from the union. And I
think it's important that we're involved in seeing what's going
on at the Finland shipyards, the Japanese shipyards. We're
seeing first-hand the information and the technology the management people are looking at."8
As Fitzgerald and Libby indicate, both management and labor at
BIW made a conscious decision to forge a relationship based on cooperation rather than on antagonism for the good of all concerned.
B.

The Concept of Teaming

Under the union's prerogative, the climate of cooperation was
carried a step further when on July 22, 1993, the union received
management approval of the teaming concept that would serve as
the foundational underpinning in transforming the organizational
and production techniques at BIW. 188 The joint union-management
187. James M. McCarthy, Working Together to Save Shipbuilding Jobs, THE
TIMES RECORD, March 2, 1994, at 15.

188. The Joint Union, Management Teams/Committees Guidelines contained
twelve specific points. They are as follows:
1) All mandatory subjects of bargaining are the exclusive right of Local S/
6, and management cannot bypass the Union by unilaterally implementing
changes in subjects of bargaining.
2) All Joint Teams/Committees that are formed must have the approval of

Local S/6 prior to the participation of any Local S/6 members, which approval will not be unreasonably withheld.
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team and conmittee guidelines, which were proposed by the union

and approved by management, "[give] workers equal say with management on issues affecting the future of the company by giving
them representation on committees ranging from safety and project
bidding to the company's efforts to re-enter commercial shipbuild-

ing.",189 The underlying principle of the teaming agreement, followed in the committee

guidelines, is the idea of equal

representation and consensus in decision-making. The joint teams/
committees are to have an equal number of labor and management

representatives, and decisions affecting joint team interaction are to
be arrived at by consensus; all members of the team must agree to

support a decision.
C. Bargainingand Drafting the New Agreement Dissolution of
the Adversarial Model
The teaming concept was added to the existing collective bargain-

ing agreement with early success. The existing contract between
management and labor, however, was due to expire in August, 1994,

which could have meant failure for the burgeoning cooperative
movement at BIW. The new collective bargaining agreement would

require the approval of a majority of the workers represented by the
union. The initial cooperative efforts of the union and management
either would be embraced or rejected by the workers themselves.
3) All Joint Teams/Committees that are approved will have at least 50%
participation of bargaining unit employees, (Local S/6), to be selected by
the President or his Designee.
4) All Joint Teams will be registered with the UnionlCompany Oversight
Committee.
5) No Joint Teams will violate the Labor Agreement in any manner.
6) Training-Joint Teams may receive training in team building, problem
solving communications, conflict resolution, (P.S.D.M.), etc
7) Decisions affecting Joint Team interaction will be arrived at by consensus (consensus means all members of the Team must agree to support a
decision).
8) Quorum: To have a quorum and make decisions, there has to be at least
50% participation from both sides, (no quorum, you may still have a workshop but cannot make any decisions effecting [sic] the teams role and
responsibility).
9) Joint Teams must understand they cannot discuss mandatory subjects of
bargaining unless approved by the Union/Company Oversight Committee.
10) It is the intent of all Joint Teams to communicate final results to effected [sic] parties.
11) Any additions, changes, or exceptions to this agreement can be made
by the UnionCompany Oversight Committee.
12) Teams may select Facilitators by consensus, from within the team or
may request a Facilitator from outside who will become a member of the
team in accordance with the rest of this agreement.
BIW AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 11-12.
189. Candace Lawson, BIW 'Teaming' Replaces Conflict, TiH TibcEs RECORD,
July 20, 1994, at 1, 14.
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While approval could lead to an historic change at BIW, rejection
could lead to a strike and a retreat to the adversarial posturing that
marked earlier collective bargaining sessions. The concern over potential rejection by the workers showed just how deep-seated the
mistrust was (and in some cases is) that existed between management and labor at BIW and throughout American workplaces.
Recognizing that they stood at a crossroads, management and labor began a joint effort to draft the new collective bargaining agreement. According to Buzz Fitzgerald, "This was an entirely new
process.... This was collaborative." 19 Beginning in April 1993 a
group of forty employees representing the union and the company
started an in-house program to train people to work cooperatively
and make decisions by consensus. The group then "worked virtually
full-time drafting the [new] contract."' 191 A six-member "contract
review team" composed of labor and management representatives
evaluated and scrutinized the 1991 contract and made suggestions
for change. 9 2 The contract review team was supported by an "issue
support team" that would provide any additional research needed
by the review team in formulating its recommendations. 193 The recommendations of the review team were reported to a fifteen-member negotiating team which, upon completion of a chapter of the
contract, would forward it to the union shop stewards to explain it to
the rank and file workers. 9 4 Consistent with the guidelines contained in their teaming agreement, each team or committee comprised equal representation from management and labor. All
decisions were made by consensus.
Management even employed a more cooperative voting process.
For the first time in BIW's history, company officials allowed union
members to vote on company time and on company property. 95
On September 19, 1994, the historic vote took place. BIW workers
approved the new collective bargaining agreement by a two-to-one
margin. The vote, 3280 for and 1550 against, represented a true majority. "Almost 91 percent of the union's 5300 members voted that
day, and those voting in favor 96of the contract represented almost 62
percent of the membership."'
190. L. Mercedes Wesel, BIW Bosses, Labor About to Step into Era of Cooperation, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Aug. 21, 1994, at 1A, 9A.

191.
192.
193.
194.

1l at 9A.
Id.
Id.
Id. The negotiating and review teams are also responsible for the imple-

mentation of the contract. "One of their first tasks [was] to appoint permanent area

governing committees and a 10-member contract interpretation team. Six members
of that group [came] from among the two original teams, two will come from management and two more from the union."

195. 1d
196. Id.
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The BIW Agreement

The goal of the collective bargaining agreement between BV
and members of the IUMSWAIIAM, Local S/6 is clear- "A true
commitment to teamwork to produce a labor agreement that promotes maximum efficiency and preservation of jobs."" 9 This goal
relies on the essential premise that the two sides have mutual and
shared interests in the success of the enterprise. This premise has
not been an underlying assumption of labor relations in American
history. The agreement represents a departure from the adversarial
approach to labor relations.
Teaming and cooperation have enabled BIW to employ extensive
cooperative techniques to achieve its stated goal. BIW recognized
the value and worth of workers, who, when given the opportunity to
contribute in the thought-process and decision-making of the enterprise, become a valuable asset to the company rather than adversaries or simply commodities.
The BIW agreement integrates many of the cooperative techniques recommended by the Dunlop Commission and described in
the previous section. Through its premise of teaming and cooperation, the agreement has attempted to create a workplace in which
labor and management work together to improve the quality of the
product, maximize efficiency at the workplace, and preserve jobs by
remaining competitive. The following discussion describes the philosophical underpinning of the agreement, explains the actual committee structure employed, and analyzes the transformation in
production techniques. It also addresses just how far the agreement
actually goes in creating a real partnership between management
and labor.
E. Philosophical Underpinning
The philosophical underpinning of the agreement was an intent to
create an atmosphere at BIW of mutual respect and trust in order to
achieve mutual goals. This required a transformation in the traditional roles of labor and management and a change in deeply rooted
suspicions and perceptions. The philosophy of the agreement reads:
"We believe everyone wants to be part of an organization
where people are empowered to be successful, are responsible
for their actions and share in the rewards of being the best. By
creating an atmosphere of trust and respect, through education and training, open communications, commitment, and
problem solving, we will achieve our goal of maximum efficiency and job preservation to the benefit of all." 193
197. BIW AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 1.
198. Id. at 3.
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The Dunlop Commission reported that a primary obstacle to co-

operative efforts across the U.S. economy was a lack of trust between workers, management, and organized labor. 1" In particular,
the Commission reported that many workers feel that employee
participation and productivity plans are employed solely to benefit
management in terms of profitability and efficiency. Success in

these areas, workers reported, would result in loss of jobs.2 00 Similarly, the Commission reported fears of high start-up costs as con-

tributing to management's skepticism of participatory plans.2"'
"Building a trusting relationship between workers and employers so

that workers are highly motivated and contribute their ideas to the
firm constitutes a long term investment.... Management surveys

report layoffs and downsizing are the single biggest threat
to the
' 02
continuity of employee participation in industry today."
The circumstances described in these findings were a very real
problem for advocates of the cooperative plan at BIW. Manage-

ment and labor, however, elected to address the issue of trust and
commitment head-on. The idea of job security, once viewed as the

sole prerogative of labor, became a mutual concern and a primary
199. DUNLOP COMM'N FACr FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 49.
200. Id. In order to highlight this point, the Commission reported the testimony
of Mr. Romie Manan, an employee of National Semiconductor. Testifying at the
San Jose hearings, he "told of how he and his fellow [workers] were bitter about
being laid off after contributing ideas to improve productivity of his operations." Id.
National Semiconductor planned to transfer this work to a new plant in another
state. Mr. Manan testified:
The Company claims that th6se teams give us a voice in running the plant
and a place where we can talk about our problems. In reality, however, in
these groups, all the company ever wants to talk about are ways to make
National (the company) more productive, more efficient, and more
profitable.
Over the past seven or eight years, our company has shifted production
from our plant to lower wage plants in Arlington, Texas and Portland,
Maine. Thousands of my fellow workers on the fab lines have lost their
jobs in the process. I will lose mine too, next week after working many
years in that factory.
d at 49-50.
201. Id. at 51. The Commission reported that the Labor Policy Association found
that conflicts between managers was a more significant obstacle to employee Involvement efforts than were employees or unions. This intra-management conflict
resulted from a combination of high start-up costs, which include resources spent on
"training, consulting services, and management and employee time away from 'normal' activities," and a sense that benefits from the plans are difficult to measure or
predict. The conflict arises "within management between advocates for these
changes and those who want to measure their costs and benefits of these efforts
before the benefits are realized." Ild. The Labor Policy Association reported that,
among managers who described "their cooperative efforts had been less successful
than expected, 42 percent cited management resistance, 39 percent cited employee
resistance, and 28 percent cited union resistance as a problem." Id.
202. Id. (citation omitted).
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goal of the labor agreement. The BIW agreement declares job se-

curity as its purpose:
We believe job security to be the foundation for BIW to
become globally competitive. Attributes of a secure work organization include employee stability, flexibility to effect
change, maximum efficiency through teaming, and a sense of
commitment by all. It also produces peace of mind that will
create an environment of trust. This trust will be the foundation for cooperation that allows us
20 3to deal with all current and
future challenges to our success

In order to gain the trust of the workers, and to prove its commitment to the "new" enterprise, management agreed to a no-layoff
clause that was to last for the entirety of the three-year agree-

ment.2° In return for this promise the workers were to reciprocate

by agreeing to alter their traditional production techniques and to

learn new skills."' (The particulars of the new production techniques are discussed in detail in a later section.) It is important to
note that the learning of new skills and the transformation of pro-

duction techniques proved to be a major obstacle to gaining worker
support. There was concern among the workers, similar to that reported by the Dunlop Commission, that the primary goal of management in this area was improved efficiency. In particular, the
workers were concerned that the improved efficiency achieved during the three-year agreement would result in the loss of many jobs
upon the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement and its
no-layoff clause in 19971 The process of collective bargaining is
one of compromise, and time will tell the results of this particular
compromise.
203. BDV AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 22.
204. Id.The agreement reads: "There will be no involuntary layoffs for the duration of this agreement for those employees on the payroll as of the date of ratification. Employees laid off with recall rights as of the date of ratification who are
recalled during the life of the contract will also be included." Id. The agreement
also provides that any fluctuations in work, which would normally result in layoffs,
would now be jointly reviewed by senior BBV and Local S/6 officials in order to
identify and implement solutions. With the option of involuntary layoffs conspicuously absent, the list of possible responses to work fluctuations include: "pursue
new work; employee reassignment flexibility; retraining;, reduction of work hours;
schedule acceleration; voluntary layoff; voluntary time off; job sharing; subcontract
work-both in and out; overtime use; and early retirement." Id The only exceptions to the no involuntary layoff commitment could result from the "cancellation of
contract(s), natural disaster(s), or catastrophic event(s)."
205. The agreement expressly sanctions this tradeoff. "The company's commitment to the employees' future is continued employment through no layoffs, increased compensation, as well as increased post employment security through the
LAM Pension Plan. The employees' commitment must be the willingness to learn,
adapt, and safely apply additional skills to their crafts to maximize our competitiveness." Id. at 23.
206. See Fitzgerald remarks, supra note 181.
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F. The Significance of a Strong Union Voice
Among the most significant factors leading to success of cooperative plans in the U.S. workplace is the presence of a strong union
voice to represent the concerns of the workers. As previously
noted, the legality of cooperative plans is often called into question
under section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA in the absence of an independent union voice. In addition, the Dunlop Commission reported
deep skepticism among workers of cooperative plans employed
under the sole prerogative of management and in the absence of an
independent union.2 °7 Similarly, the Commission reported that
union leaders distrust managers' motives for employing workplace
cooperation in the absence of union representation. Union leaders
often view employee participation initiatives as union avoidance
techniques, a motivation that has been documented as one, but not
the sole, motivation for some of the historical and current workplace
innovations introduced by non-union employers.208 Likewise, the
Commission reported that management questions union leaders'
"ability to support cooperation and employee participation, believe[s] unions will hold cooperation hostage to achieve other objectives, or [is] unwilling to share information and power with union
leaders in the belief that the company will be 'contractually' bound
to continue joint decision-making in the future. ' '209
G. AFL-CIO Principlesfor Labor-ManagementPartnership
The Commission reported that efforts in unionized settings are
most likely to be successful when the union is involved as a joint
partner with management. "A number of individual unions... [in
turn] have recently publicly endorsed employee participation and 21
labor-management partnerships as an explicit policy objective., 1
Most notably, the AFL-CIO recently released a report entitled The
New American Workplace: A Labor Perspective.2n The organization outlined its support for labor-management partnerships and for
designing new models of work organizations that utilize independent unions as equal and joint partners in the evolving American
workplace of cooperation. In stressing the importance of union representation in cooperative settings, the AFL-CIO concluded:
The new systems of work organization require, as a first requisite, that workers be represented by free and independent labor unions which they control. The very presence of such a
207. DUNLOP COMM'N FACT FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 31.
208. Id. at 50 (citing FRED FOULKES, PERSONNEL POLICIES IN LARGE NONUNION
FIRMS (1980); DAVID W. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB (1989)).

209. Id. at 51.
210. Id. Among the unions listed in this regard were the Steelworkers, CWA, the
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, and the Grain Millers.
211. THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 62.
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union fundamentally changes the nature of the workplace and
the relationship between the individual worker and the employer. Trade union representation removes fear from the
workplace and assures workers the protection that is essential
if they are to feel free to express their views and to fully participate in workplace decisions. And such unions provide the
vehicle through which workers can be represented with respect to decisions that affect their work lives.21 2
The fact that cooperation blurs the distinction between labor and
management does not obviate the need for a strong union that is
willing to compromise when necessary and hold firm when
necessary.
In its report, the AFL-CIO outlined its principles for a true labormanagement partnership in the new American workplace. These
principles are summarized as follows:
First, we seek partnerships based on mutual recognition and
respect.... A partnership requires management to accept and
respect the union's right to represent the workers in unorganized units to join a union....
Second.... the partnerships we seek must be based on the
collective bargaining relationship. Changes in work organizations must be mutually agreed to-and not unilaterally imposed-and must be structured so as to assure the union's
ability to bargain collectively on behalf of the workers it represents on an ongoing basis....
Third, the partnerships must be founded on the principle of
equality. In concrete terms, this means that unions and management must have an equal role in the development and implementation of new work systems ....
Fourth, the partnerships must be dedicated to advancing
certain agreed-upon goals reflecting the parties' mutual
interests... 213
H. AFL-CIO PrinciplesApplied to BIW
The AFL-CIO has praised the BIW collective bargaining agreement as a national model for workplace cooperation. Thomas Donahue, Secretary of the AFL-CIO, stated that "Bath has something to
be proud of .... It is, for certain, a development that will change
the way American businesses make decisions." '14 George Kourpias,
President of the International Association of Machinists, stated that
"[h]ere [at BIW], union members share equal representation and
212. Id. at 11.
213. Id. at 11-12; see also DuNLOP COMM'N FACr FINDING REP., supra note 11, at
50.
214. Steven M. Pappas, Labor Charts a New Course at BIW, THE TiMEs REC.
ORD, Mar. 2, 1994, at 17. See generally Secretary-Treasurer Thomas R. Donahue,
Remarks on Labor Day, Bath, Maine (Sept. 5, 1994).
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equal power with the company at every level of every program....
This labor-management team will be a model for our country of
real, authentic cooperation. '2 15 Kourpias made these remarks in a
speech to union and non-union workers at BIW. In an unprecedented move, BIW halted its operations to allow Kourpias to give
his address.21 6
The praise and accolades the BIW agreement has received are
well deserved. The BIW agreement successfully incorporates the
AFL-CIO principles for labor-management partnership into an
agreement that represents a true commitment to workplace cooperation. BIW has recognized the value of its union as a partner in its
enterprise and, through the mechanism of teaming and joint decision-making, has included the union and its workers as an equal
voice in the decisions that affect the workers and the running of the
business. The BIW agreement provides:
Local S/6 and BIW recognize the value of a labor organization and its role as a full partner in developing BIW into a
high performance work organization. In recognition of the
importance of union participation in the future of our organization, we will move forward as a team. Through mutual recognition and respect of each other's roles and responsibilities
we will develop and achieve an environment of trust.21 7
The new approach at BIW, initiated in large part out of economic
necessity, has the potential to yield significant efficiencies that many
other businesses may also enjoy by implementing the cooperative
model.
I.

The New American Workplace

The overriding theme of the AFL-CIO report is a call for the dissolution of the "dominant system of work organization" and the creation of a new American workplace that joins in a partnership with
unionized workers to create "new work systems which alter in the
most basic ways the manner in which work is organized, businesses
are managed, and labor and management treat each other., 2 18 According to the AFL-CIO, the "dominant system of work organization" has been the prevalent form of work organization in the
United States for the better part of this century.21 9 This system of
work organization has been organized around four core principles:
First, and most fundamentally, the basic premise of the dominant system of work organization is that the tasks of thinking,
215. James B. Parks, Machinists Gain 'Equal Voice' in Shipyard Contract,AFLCIO NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 3.
216. Id.

217. BIW AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 5.
218. THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 62, at 1.
219. Id.
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planning and decision-making are best done by an elite corps
of thinkers, planners, and deciders .... [T]heir fundamental
role is to centralize knowledge about, and control over, the
workplace.
[S]econd, that the role of the individual worker is to perform
assigned tasks in an assigned manner. This is accomplished in
the archetypal work organization through a high degree of
specialization and division of labor. Each worker is given a
small, fixed task to be repetitively performed. The worker requires and develops great expertise in that task, rather than
broader knowledge or more general skills.
Third, this work organization requires a hierarchical, regimented environment in which layers of management are created to assure that the decisions of the thinkers and planners
are correctly executed. Through this chain of command decisions are communicated to workers who are instructed in what
they are expected to do and then are closely monitored to
make sure that the workers do as they are told. When
problems or issues arise, those issues are carried up the chain
of command to the appropriate level of supervision for a
decision.
Fourth and finally, in this dominant method of work organization workers are seen by management and owners as merely
another "input" into the production process-a disposable
commodity like any other production input. The employer's
aim is to get the maximum output from the worker at the lowest possible cost. 2 0
According to the AFL-CIO, this method of work organization has
had disastrous effects on American workers. The dominant system
"does not respect basic worker rights, recognize worker potential,
and in consequence does not satisfy basic worker needs."2'2 The
dominant model "does not allow workers the opportunity to make a
full contribution because it denies workers the freedom to use their
capacities and skills fully, let alone to further develop those capacities and skills."'
In short, the dominant system of work organization, by suppressing worker discretion and input, has denied
workers a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment in their work'
The dominant system of work organization also has had negative
economic effects on the American workplace. According to the
AFL-CIO, the dominant model is plagued by inefficiencies that
have substantially increased the costs of products and services? 2 4
These inefficiencies include "a large number of 'indirect workers'consultants, planners, thinkers, decision makers, schedulers, super220. Id.at 3-4.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 5.

223. See id.
224. See id. at 7.
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visors, managers, inspectors and the like

.... ,225 In addition, the
"hierarchical, bureaucratic structure of the traditional work system
is, moreover, incapable of responding quickly to new needs or
desires of the marketplace. And by setting rigid norms of standardized performance, the traditional work system has always had the
perverse effect of stifling worker initiative and discretionary
22 6

effort.

'

As discussed, many American workplaces, faced with mounting
economic pressures from competitors both home and abroad, are
transforming their production and decision-making techniques to include more cooperative efforts. These efforts have included production and quality centered initiatives, self-managed work teams,
workplace committees and partnerships, and employee ownership
plans. According to the Dunlop Commission, however, few American workplaces have achieved what has popularly been referred to
as a "high performance" workplace. 2 7 The Commission reported
that, while there is no single standard to judge which, or what, combination of different workplace practices achieve this label, the experts agree that:
[T]he value of these practices is realized best when combined
into a total organizational system that rests on a foundation of
trust and combines employee participation, information sharing, and work organization flexibility with reinforcing human
resource practices such as a commitment to training and development, gain sharing, employment security, and where a union
is present, a full partnership between union leaders and
management. 22 s
When judged by this systemic standard, however, the Commission
reported a low success rate across the American economy, perhaps
as low as five percent.2 9
The AFL-CIO echoed this conclusion and determined that until
recently, efforts to reform the traditional system of work organization "have not addressed the fundamentals of the problem and consequently have failed to take root." 230 The AFL-CIO points out,
however, that several industrial giants, service industry enterprises,
and public agencies have successfully transformed their workplaces.
In particular the AFL-CIO points out how integrated work systems
have "helped save parts of the automotive and steel industries, and
have improved the performance of major manufacturers such as
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See DUNLOP COMM'N FACt FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 36.
228. Id.
229. Id. The Commission referred to estimates made by the Commission on the
Skills of the American Workforce and by Jerome Rosow, President of the Work in
America Institute.
230. THE NEw AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 62, at 8.
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Xerox and Coming Glass."'" Summarizing such experiences and

experiments throughout the American economy, the AFL-CIO discerned five basic principles which together define their model for

the new system of work organization. They are, in part, as follows:
First, the model begins by rejecting the traditional dichotomy
between thinking and doing, conception and execution.... '
Second, in the new model, jobs are redesigned to include a
greater variety of skills and tasks and, more importantly,
greater responsibility for the ultimate output of the
organization ... 3
Third, this new model of work organization substitutes for the
traditional, multi-layered, hierarchy a flatter management
structure...
Fourth, the new model goes beyond the workplace level to insist that workers, through their unions, are entitled to a decision-making role at all levels of the enterprise .... 235
231. 1d
232. The principle goes on to read:
Workers-the individuals who actually do what it is the organization is doing-are in the best position to decide how their work can most efficiently
and effectively be accomplished. Such decisions are never final but should
be constantly revisited through an ongoing process in which change is the
only constant. This process requires a fundamental redistribution of decision-making authority from management to teams of workers. These
workers must not only be given such decision-making authority but also
must be afforded the opportunity to develop and refine analytic and problem-solving skills so that they will be able to make the best possible work
decisions.

IdL

233. This principle goes on to read:
Workers are organized into work groups (or teams); the workers learn not
merely a particular task but an understanding of the overall process of producing a good or service and often they are trained to perform the various
functions required for that process. Moreover, workers are given the authority, and the training, to exercise discretion, judgment and creativity on
the job. Workers' ingenuity is viewed as a key to success; workers are free
to do the right thing, rather than being compelled to do the prescribed
thing.
Id at 8-9.
234. This principle goes on to read:
At the same time, the role of the manager is transformed since the aim of
the system is no longer to assure that workers do prescribed tasks, in prescribed manners, for prescribed intervals. In this less authoritarian work
culture, the aim is to enable workers to be self-managers who are responsible for their own performance, and the work teams are often self-managed
with responsibility for scheduling work, ordering materials, hiring workers
and the like. The foreman is replaced by a team leader, the role is to lead
rather than mandate.
Id. at 9.

235. This principle continues:
Just as workers understand best how the work should be organized, workers-through their representatives-have expertise to contribute to strate-
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Fifth and finally, the new model of work organization calls for
the rewards realized from organizing work on equitable terms
agreed upon through negotiations between labor and

management.2 36

These five principles form an integrated whole-a vision of
a new system of work organization. They combine individual
participationthrough restructured work processes and redesigned jobs, with collective representation, through restructured decision-making processes from the shop floor to
corporate headquarters. The aim of this approach is to
achieve work organizations which at one and the same time
Therein lies the
are more productive and more democratic.
237
source of its legitimacy and its power.
J.

BIW-A New American Workplace

The collective bargaining agreement that was signed on June 14,
1994, between BIW and the IUMSWA/JIAM achieves the principles

outlined by the AFL-CIO, implements systemic changes resulting in
a "high performance" work organization, and creates a "new American workplace" based upon the premises of trust and respect,
shared goals, and equality in decision-making. The efforts at BIW
represent a genuine commitment to cooperative techniques that
clearly depart from traditional workplace structures and dramatically alter the basic relationship between management and labor.
The changes envisioned in the BIW collective bargaining agreement
were the result of a joint effort between management and organized
gic decisions as well including, for example, about what new technologies
should be acquired or about what changes to make in products or services.
Moreover, as stakeholders in the enterprise, workers have a vital interest in
the strategic decisions which ultimately determine how much work will be
done, where and by whom. Because workers have long-term ties to their
jobs, they bring a long-term perspective and can be counted on to promote
policies designed to insure that businesses have long-term futures and can
provide long-term employment at decent wages. Thus, in this new model
such strategic decisions are to be jointly made by workers-acting through
their unions-and other stakeholders.
Id.

236. Id. at 8-9. This last principle continues:
This means, in the first instance, a negotiated agreement to protect income
and employment security to the maximum extent possible. Of equal importance it means a negotiated agreement to compensate workers fairly for
their enhanced contribution to the success of the organization. This may
be achieved through increases in base wages or, in other cases, through
agreements providing for some form of supplementary contingent compensation (such as gain sharing, profit sharing, stock ownership or the like).
What is most important is that the worker's share is not set as an act of
grace by managers and owners but is the product of a negotiated agreement between the employer and the union representing the workers.
Id. at 9.

237. Id.
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labor to save both jobs and the enterprise. The new American
workplace at BIW empowers workers to use their discretion and
judgment, and gives them a sense of value, achievement, and selfworth. The BIW agreement combines the best of the various workplace cooperative techniques outlined by the Dunlop Commission,
and integrates them into a systemic whole. The agreement blurs the
lines between management and labor and signifies the end of the
adversarial culture of labor relations at BIW. The following section
describes the details of the teaming structure, the changes it makes
in decision-making apparatus, and the dramatic alteration of the
production techniques for which it provides.
K

Teaming and Joint Decision-Making: Disregardingthe
Mandatory/PermissiveDistinction

The concept of teaming is the foundation of the B1W collective
bargaining agreement. This concept entails decision-making by consensus and equal representation on various committees. The agreement provides for the establishment of Joint Process Teams
comprised of an equal number of union and management members.
"These teams are established for the purpose of reviewing specific
work processes, identifying areas of improved efficiency, and recommending process improvement suggestions to the Oversight Committee."' 8 The Oversight Committee, which also comprises an
equal number of management and union representatives, approves
forms, and oversees the Joint Process teams. The agreement provides for the recognition of Local S/6 Committees that include an
apprenticeship committee, benefits committee, grievance committee(s), human rights committee, and safety and health committee.
Most collective bargaining agreements include a management
function clause that designates certain responsibilities as the sole
prerogative of management. In addition the law, through section
8(d) of the NLRA, has determined that certain entrepreneurial decisions are left to the sole discretion of management. These decisions are viewed as non-mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
and may be imposed unilaterally upon the work-force. They included basic changes in the scope and nature of the enterprise and
decisions that entail major capital investment. Through the teaming
agreement and consensus decision-making, however, management
at BIW has given up much of its entrepreneurial discretion and has
empowered the workers to share responsibility for these subjects.
What is truly remarkable about the BIW agreement is the scope
of issues and subjects for which management has agreed to share its
responsibility with labor. The agreement divides labor and management responsibilities into five separate categories: 1) those to be
238. BIW AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 10.
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jointly developed and implemented with joint approval;23 9 2) those
to be developed by management and implemented with joint approval;24° 3) those to be developed by management and implemented with information available to the union;241 4) shared
responsibilities; 242 and 5) employees' responsibilities (management
and Local S/6). 243 Under consensus decision-making, the agreement
provides that "[w]here joint approval is required, implementation
will not occur until consensus is reached. Reasonable options must
be explored. You cannot just say no." 244
Responsibilities to be jointly developed and implemented with
joint approval include those involving "new technology" and "strategic business and marketing plan." Under the category of responsi-

bilities to be developed by management but implemented with joint
approval are "plan to scope/rescope work," "subcontract plan," and
"new job classifications." These are the types of responsibility one
traditionally would expect to find reserved to the sole prerogative of
management under a management function clause. However,

through the process of collective bargaining and the concept of
teaming, union and management have created a workplace where

consensus decision-making reaches nearly every department and as239. Under this category each party may present an idea or concept to the other.
The idea is then jointly reviewed and, if accepted, the idea is developed with a plan
for implementation. The topics for joint development/approval/implementation include: "Communications affecting the labor agreement; Corporate yaining Plan;
New technology; Administration of [the labor] agreement; Change of health insurance carrier; Recognition and reward program(s); [and] Strategic business and marketing plan." Id.at 7.
240. Under this category management is responsible to develop the idea but implementation must be by joint approval under consensus decision-making. These
decisions include: "Plan to scope/rescope work; Plan for Classification Support
Center staffing adjustments (i.e., hiring, recall, transfer plans); Subcontract plan;
Manufacturing long-range overtime plan; New job classifications; [and] Reasonable
rules and regulations." Id
241. Responsibilities in this category include: "Merit raises; Discharge decisions;
Assigning jobs; Providing company tools; Promotion decisions; Disciplinary decisions; Regulating equipment and property; Medical decisions; FMLA administration; Employee performance evaluations; Yard closure decisions; [and] Decrease the
work force." Id. at 8.
242. Responsibilities in this category include: "Safety and health of employees;
Investigations; Represent employees and their work; Payment of dues; Community
involvement ...; Support teaming/teamwork; [R]equire employees to follow rules;
Involve the right people in decisionmaking; [P]rotect the environment... ; Leadership for a successful company; High quality of work; Solve problems at the lowest
level; Preservation of jobs; [and] Promote maximum efficiency." Id.
243. Responsibilities in this category include: "Work safely; Provide personal
tools ... ; Notice for family and medical leave; Do high quality work; Follow rules
and regulations; Work efficiently; [O]ffer suggestions for improvement where you
can; Resolve problems at the lowest level; Be responsible for your actions; Work
within the labor agreement; [and] Change of address to Personnel Records." Id. at
9.
244. Id.
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pect of the enterprise. The only notable exception to this is the area
of discipline, which is reserved under the BIW agreement to the sole
discretion of management.
To better illustrate the amount of entrepreneurial discretion that
management at BIW has agreed to share with the union and its
workers, an examination of the "Strategic Business Planning/Marketing" Team is helpful. The area of strategic business planning and
marketing is clearly viewed as a non-mandatory subject of collective
bargaining under section 8(d) of the NLRA. Alterations in the
product, tapping new markets, and the amount of output have traditionally been viewed as subjects within the sole discretion of management. As a permissive or non-mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, management is free to make these decisions unilaterally
without consulting with or bargaining over the decision with the
union.
Under the BIW agreement, however, management has invited labor to join as a partner in making decisions in this important area,
one that goes directly to the scope and nature of the enterprise. The
agreement provides:
Developing and implementing a joint long range strategic
business and marketing plan is a vital ingredient in the future
preservation of jobs. Through the effective utilization and improvement of all of our assets, we will develop new business
lines and markets. We will work toward joint cooperation at
the local, state, and national levels which will enhance our
ability to compete globally.... Bath Iron Works and Local S/
6 are committed to working together on the long range strategic business and marketing plan.2 45
The formation and existence of this team serves as a vivid example of the overall retreat from the adversarial model of labor relations at BIW. Rather than treat one another as foe, both parties at
BIW have approached the collective bargaining table with mutual
interests and shared concerns: the preservation of jobs through increased productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness. In this regard
the agreement goes "beyond what traditionally has been perceived
Agreements such as the
as appropriate bargaining procedure."2''
one reached at BIW represent "private responses to the tradition7
ally adversarial, autocratic labor-management relationship,"" and
show the potential that exists when the parties look beyond the judicially-created demarcation lines of mandatory and permissive subjects of collective bargaining.
245. See id at 80.
246. In Search of IndustrialPeace, supra note 25. at 597. The author referred to
the General Motors-UAW Saturn cooperative agreement.
247. Id. at 599.
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The formation of these teams has served to propel the workers at
BIW into the decision-making apparatus of the enterprise. The
agreement has provided the workers with equal say in nearly every
aspect of the enterprise. As David Libby, President of Local S/6
stated, "Now management knows they have to listen to the workers.
And the workers know they will get listened to, because now the
union has as much say as management."2 "8 In terms of the AFLCIO principles, the workers have been given a decision-making role
at all levels of the enterprise. The workers have gained the opportunity to contribute their expertise to strategic decisions including
"about what new technologies should be acquired or about what
changes to make in products or services."2'4 9 This decision-making
power, in turn, has helped to give workers a sense of worth and
accomplishment in the enterprise. As David Libby stated, "It not
only lets the people's ideas come across, it gives the people a sense
250
of accomplishment when they know they've made a difference."
L.

High Performance Workplace-Production Techniques

Management and labor at BIW have taken their cooperative efforts a step further by rejecting the traditional dominant system of
work organization and creating in its stead a "high performance
work organization" that radically alters the production techniques
employed at BIW. The basic outline for the organization provides
for significant restructuring of jobs, training, and a pay system based
upon multiple trades. The agreement summarizes the BIW High
Performance Work Organization as follows:
Our High Performance Work Organization will empower
employees to make decisions that will enable them to deliver
superior value to our customers, shareholders, and employees.
We will have shared responsibilities and gain shared benefits.
Through training and communications, high performance
skills will be provided to allow a work environment that will
be flexible enough to reduce costs and be competitive in a
world market. The compensation system will encourage employees to acquire additional skills and share in profits. And,
most importantly, results will include employment security
51
and a better quality of life for Bath Iron Works employees.2
In the past shipbuilding production at BIW had been plagued by
idle stand-around time due to inefficiencies in the production process. Buzz Fitzgerald in an interview with the Times Record stated,
248. James B. Parks, Machinists Gain 'Equal Voice' in Shipyard Contract, AFLCIO NEWS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 3.
249. THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 62, at 9.
250. James M. McCarthy, Working Together to Save Shipbuilding Jobs, THE
TIMES RECORD, Mar. 2, 1994, at 17.

251. BIW

AGREEMENT,

supra note 2, at 33.
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"[T]he way we have run our shipyards has generated a lot of inefficiencies in terms of idle time-of workers who want to work but
can't because the plans aren't there, the materials aren't there, the
proper direction isn't there."' The High Performance Work Organization at BIW is designed to combat this problem by offering
training and financial incentive to workers to become multi-crafted
in the field of shipbuilding. Changing the workers' traditional role
of each performing a single function in the shipbuilding process, the
High Performance Work Organization encourages the learning and
implementation of many skills so that workers contribute more efficiently and with a better understanding of the entire operation. In
addition, the new work system empowers workers to "develop ideas,
plan the work, and make decisions on how the work is to be carried
out." 3' The new work organization creates a less authoritarian
work environment and provides for greater worker autonomy and
discretion at the job site. In effect, BIW's High Performance Work
Organization rejects the "traditional dichotomy between thinking
and doing, conception and execution."54
The High Performance Work Organization Issue Support Team at
BIW drafted the following principles to serve as the foundation for
the new work organization. They are reproduced here in their entirety because, taken together, they represent the most accurate description of the systemic and fundamental changes provided for in
the collective bargaining agreement and currently underway at
BIW's new American workplace. The High Performance Work Organization principles describe BIW as follows:
o It is an organization where employees develop ideas, plan
the work, and make decisions on how the work is to be
carried out.
o It is an organization where superior performance and continuous process improvement will reduce costs, increase
capacity, and result in job security.
" It is a process oriented organization that continually trains
its employees to be multi-skilled.
o It is an organization with a work environment flexible
enough to allow it to be competitive.
o It is an organization with a compensation system that encourages employees to acquire additional skills and rewards them for doing so.
o It is an organization with a communication network for the
free flow of ideas and information for all to meet common
goals.
252. James M. McCarthy, Update"BIW's Five-Year Plan, THE TIMEs RECORD.
Jan. 26, 1994, at 17.
253. BIW Agreement, supra note 2, at 22a.
254. THE NEw AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 62, at 8; see also supra pp.
80-81.
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* It is an organization where all employees share in the profits and acquire ownership in the company.
* It is an organization that makes it possible for all employees to accept responsibility for completing high quality
work on schedule and within budget.
" It is a motivated team which, through job satisfaction, is
committed to the long-term success of all employees.
" It is an organization that will be globally competitive by
achieving the lowest supervisor and support ratio in
manufacturing.
* It is an organization that delivers superior value
to the cus255
tomer, the shareholders, and the employees.
M.

The Alignment/Progression Model

The High Performance Work Organization at BIW will employ an
alignment model in which workers can volunteer to learn additional
skills that they will employ to become multi-crafted. "Pay increases
now depend on the extent to which workers participate in the program.... ,256 Just as the AFL-CIO urged in its principles for a new
American workplace, the BIW model provides workers the opportunity to learn and perform many skills and tasks and to become
familiar with the overall process employed in producing the product.
In particular, the model provides for core-skills, which "are those
singular skills that are the basis of the shipbuilding process. Core
' 257
skills can be stand alone steps or can be supporting in nature.
Next are associated skills and functions "which are supportive in nature to one's core skill and allow an employee to complete a process
within his/her craft.""2 A craft is a "number of associated skills/
functions, combined with a core skill, which allow an employee to
complete a process. The associated skills/functions must support or
complement the core skill."259 A multi-crafted employee will have
skills in more than one craft, and a "master mechanic," the ultimate
achievement, will demonstrate competency in several crafts and will
posses knowledge of the overall shipbuilding process. 260 The master
mechanic will act much like his own supervisor, will possess knowledge of the material process, demonstrate leadership skills and an
255. See BIW AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 22a.
256. L. Mercedes Wesel, Team Players Mesh Under BIW Contract, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Feb. 26, 1995, at 5B. The Maine Sunday Telegram reported:
More than 98 percent of the employees in the union have volunteered to be
trained in an associated function, so they received a 40-cent hourly raise.
They will earn another 20 cents an hour for each associated skill they learn,
up to three skills. Multi-crafted worker [sic] earn another $1 an hour.
Id.
257. BIW AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 24.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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aptitude for problem solving and decision making. 61 The entire
High Performance Work Organization is managed by three key bodies: the Contract Interpretation Team (a joint team of labor and
management), the Area Governing Committees (each made up of
three members from management and three from the union), and
Classification Support Centers (encompassing management and
union stewards).
VI.

LEGALITY OF THE

BIW

AGREEMENT UNDER THE

NLRA:

THE NEED FOR LEGAL CHANGE

The BIW agreement represents a true departure from the traditional adversarial model of labor-management relations. The agreement, by employing systemic cooperative techniques, is a radical
attempt to save an American business. Its techniques serve the multiple goals of maximizing efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness, and at the same time provide greater job satisfaction and
security for the workers involved. Efforts like the BIV agreement
should be encouraged. Cooperative workplace programs are good
for American businesses and workers alike. The legality of the
agreement, however, is questionable under several of the provisions
of the NLRA. This section analyzes the legality of the agreement
and argues that change in the law is needed to ensure that creative
efforts such as that employed at BIW are encouraged and can survive legal scrutiny.
A.

The Labor-Management Dichotomy: Exclusion of Supervisors
and Managers

Through the concepts of teaming, consensus decision-making, and
the principles of the High Performance Organization, BIV and the
shipbuilder's union have created a workplace that blurs traditional
lines between the roles of labor and management. The new work
organization enables workers to train and learn many skills, to become familiar with the overall production process, and to use judgment and creativity on the job. The new work organization has
engaged in a fundamental redistribution of decision-making authority and has empowered workers with an equal voice at all levels of
the enterprise and in every aspect of BIW pursuits. The BINV collective bargaining agreement has created a new American workplace.
The creation of this cooperative workplace, however, may have
serious legal ramifications for BIW workers. The NLRA makes a
261. Id The agreement provides that a master mechanic will demonstrate competency in all of the following- "[t]hree crafts/or highly skilled specialist who volunteers for three crafts; [k]nowledge of associated skillslfunctions; [a]bility to train in
three crafts; [k]nowledge of planning tools; [k]nowledge of cost structure;
[k]nowledge of material process; [diemonstrated leadership skills; [and] [aiptitude
for problem solving and decision making." ld.
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clear distinction between employees, who are covered by the Act's
protections, and supervisors and managers, who are not. By blurring the lines between worker and manager and including the workers in the decision-making apparatus of the enterprise, the BIW
agreement makes the status of these employees under the NLRA
uncertain. If an employee is found to be a supervisor or a manager,
that employee loses his right to bargain collectively or seek any
rights or remedies provided for in the NLRA.
Both managerial and supervisory exemptions from labor representation grew out of a single concern: "That an employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives." 6 ' The Act,
however, did not consider the type of cooperative industrial workplace that is reflected in the BIW agreement. Rather, the "Act was
intended to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry."' 263 By rejecting the dominant system of work organization and
removing the lines between thinking and doing, the BIW agreement
may result in the loss of NLRA protections for the very employees
who succeed in this new structure.
The NLRB has found that even a small measure of discretionary
authority qualifies employees as managers. In Swift & Co.264 the
Board ruled that procurement drivers who made purchases for employers were managerial. In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.2 65 the
Board ruled production schedulers were managers. Similarly, the
266
Board has ruled that lecturers who indoctrinate new employees,
personnel investigators who make hiring recommendations,2 67 and
2 68
buyers who make substantial purchases on an employer's behalf
all were managerial and therefore exempt from the Act's protections. In each of these decisions it was determined that these employees were involved in developing and enforcing employer policy.
The teaming structure, with its shared decision-making, requires
even more discretion than does any of the employee activities reviewed in these Board decisions. Beyond that, the Supreme Court's
decision in Yeshiva "means that rank and file employees who participate in work teams or joint committees can lose their right to
form an independent union. '2 69 This is true even if the union bargained for the increased responsibility and discretion granted to the
262. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980).
263. Id. at 680 (citing Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972)).
264. 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956).
265. 112 N.L.R.B. 571, 573 (1955).
266. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 194, 196 (1953).
267. Western Elec. Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 420, 423 (1952).
268. American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116-17 (1950).
269. DuNLoP COMM'N FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 10. "Indeed,
the NLRB interpreted Yeshiva so as to strip union members of their collective bargaining rights-and their union-because they negotiated an employee participa-
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workers. The union, in effect, can unintentionally bargain the workers out of the Act's protections. 270
In making its recommendation to update the definitions of supervisors and managers, the Dunlop Commission recognized that the
distinction between management and employee often is difficult to
make in today's cooperative workplaces. The Commission reported:
If a more cooperative conception of the employer-employee
relationship is embodied in labor law so that representation
does not necessarily imply the existence of an adversarial relationship, it may be necessary to reconsider whether supervisors or middle managers should be denied the right to union
representation or collective bargaining.... It would seem inconsistent with the intent of the NLRA if, in pursuit of more
innovative and cooperative work relationships, employees
27
were denied the right to independent union representation. 1
As long as there is a possibility that cooperation will disqualify
workers from the Act's protection, workers' representatives will be
less likely to agree to new workplace arrangements.
A major aspect of the teaming structure at BIW is the diffusion of
supervisory and managerial decision-making throughout the
workforce. The work teams and committees at BIW are designed to
address matters traditionally left to full-time supervisors and managers. A stated goal of the BIW agreement is to achieve the "lowest
supervisor and support ratio in manufacturing." 2 The agreement
presumes this only can be achieved by empowering rank and file
workers with the discretion and decision-making capabilities that
traditionally have been preserved for managers and supervisors.2 "
tion agreement with their employer." Id. (citing College of Osteopathic Medicine &
Surgery, 265 N.L.R.B. 295 (1982)).
270. See College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, 265 N.LR.B. 295 (1982).
271. DuNLop COMM'N FACT FINDING REP., supra note 11, at 55.
272. See BIW AGREErMNT, supra note 2, at 22a.
273. Already progress is being made toward this end. The Maine Sunday Telegram reported:
And under the teaming concept in the new contract, workers and supervisors now cooperate on planning schedules and overtime. "This makes my
job much easier," said Mason, first-shift supervisor in the blast building,
who used to be solely responsible for all scheduling.
Mason said he can now check on the progress of work in one of the blast
buildings while blasters in the other buildings prepare for the shift by assigning certain people to certain tasks.
"They don't need me to do that," Mason said.
The workers plan soon to become the first in the yard without a supervisor in the overnight shift. They already work on their own during the first
shift whenever the supervisor is out.
Mason said the increase in productivity comes from a combination of
high morale and good ideas from the workers.
L. Mercedes Wesel, Team Players Mesh under BAY Contract.MArNE SUNDAY TEL.
GRAM,

Feb. 26, 1995, at 5B.
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The BIW scenario illustrates the need to revise this area of the
law. The Dunlop Commission addresses the same need in its recommendations. The Commission recognized that individuals "whose
primary function is to carry out the employer's labor relations policy
by hiring, firing, and disciplining employees are clearly supervisors
and should continue to be excluded from the Act."274 Similarly, the
Commission recognized that "[e]mployees near the top of the firm's
managerial structure who have substantial, individual discretion to
set major company policy and whose primary function is to develop
such policy are clearly managerial employees and should also continue to be excluded."275 The Commission recommended,
These two principles should be incorporated into a single,
simplified "managerial employee" definition that includes
statutory supervisors and managers but not (1) members of
work teams and joint committees to whom managerial and/or
personnel decision-making authority is delegated or (2) professionals and
276 para-professionals who direct their less skilled
co-workers.
The Dunlop Commission's recommendation if enacted into law
would protect team members at BIW from sanctions imposed under
current law. Judges and lawmakers in Congress, however, in seeking to make new law accommodate cooperative employee-management relationships, must remember the foundational underpinnings
of the managerial and supervisory exemptions. Current law determining employee-management status calls for a fact-specific inquiry
regarding the employee's duties at work, the employee's self-perception of his role, his co-workers' perceptions, and the employer's
idea of his status. This need not change with alteration of the law.
Employers must continue to be guaranteed the undivided loyalties
of their supervisors and managers, whether in the newly cooperative
or the traditionally adversarial workplaces of America. At the same
time, however, a change in the law is needed if experiments like
BIW's are to survive and succeed. An employee must not be deterred from using discretion on the job for fear of losing his rights to
join a union or to engage in concerted activity. The use of discretion
should be encouraged by ensuring the employees' right to choose
independent representation is preserved.
B.

The Ramifications of NLRA Sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5):
Domination of a Labor Organization?
In addition to the Electromation,Inc. decision, the Board in 1993
handed down another important opinion concerning the legality of
employee participation plans under sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5). This
274. DUNLOP COMM'N FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 9.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 9-10.
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decision, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,2' provides helpful guidance for evaluating the legality of the committee and teaming
structure employed at BIW. As at BIW, the employee/employer
committees established at the various du Pont plants existed in a
unionized setting. The du Pont decision is enlightening because it
gave the Board the "opportunity to address issues raised by employee participation committees which exist in the circumstances
where employees have selected an exclusive collective bargaining
representative. 2 78
In du Pont the Board first determined whether six safety committees and one fitness committee were employer-dominated labor organizations within the meaning of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2). Second,
the Board considered an issue unique to employee participation
committees in unionized settings: whether the employer bypassed
the union in dealing with the committees and in dealing with unit
employees, thus violating section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 2 79 Each of
these two issues will be discussed below with specific reference to
legal ramifications for BIW.
1. Section 2(5): The Definition of a Labor Organization
According to the Board's analysis in du Pont, there can be little
doubt that the employer/employee committees at BIW are labor organizations under section 2(5). In du Pont the Board employed its
traditional three-part test to determine the committees' status under
section 2(5). Under this statutory test the Board concludes the entity is a labor organization if "(1) employees participate, (2) the or-

ganization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of 'dealing with'
employers, and (3) these dealings concern 'conditions of work,'
277. 311 N.L.RB. 893 (1993).
278. Id. It is important to note that the BIW and du Pont scenarios are distinguishable. At BIW, the committee structure was the result of collective bargaining.
The union and management agreed to the terms of the teaming structure. In du
Pont the committees existed alongside the union but were not established as a result
of collective bargaining. The fact that the terms of the committee structure were
bargained for at BIV,however, does not take legal review of the committees out of
the jurisdiction of the Board. If an unfair labor practice is occurring, regardless of
the existence of an agreement, the Board has jurisdiction to review the charge. 29
U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988). Comparison to du Pont highlights the centrality of collective
bargaining in the NLRA. As the analysis suggests, certain techniques employed at
du Pont were found violative of the Act in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement defining the terms of the cooperative efforts. These same techniques
would more than likely survive legal scrutiny at BIW because of the collective bargaining relationship there and because of the agreement itself. In an economy
where only 11 percent of private employees join unions and enter a collective bargaining relationship with their employer, is it rational to disallow cooperative techniques simply because there is no union to negotiate the terms of these techniques?
279. Section 8(a)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that l[ilt
shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer ...to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees ...." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
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grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of
2 80
employment.
The du Pont Board had little trouble determining that the first
and third criteria were satisfied and, as expected, the critical question in the Board's analysis became that of construing "dealing
with" under section 2(5). Relying on the Supreme Court's interpretation in Cabot Carbon, the Board determined that "dealing with"
under section 2(5) is broader than "collective bargaining."' 8 1 The
term "bargaining," the Board argued, "connotates a process by
which two parties must seek to compromise their differences and
arrive at an agreement."'
The term, "dealing with," by contrast,
does not require the two sides to seek compromise. Rather, "dealing with" involves a "bilateral mechanism between two parties '2 83
as evidenced by "a pattern or practice in which a group of employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or
''2
deed, and compromise is not required. 1
In concluding that the committees in question were in fact "labor
organizations" designed to "deal with" the employer, the Board relied on evidence that would dictate the identical conclusion for the
teams and committees at BIW. Like BIW, the committees at du
Pont were made up of both management and employee representatives who were full participating members. The committees discussed proposals with management representatives both inside and
outside the committees. Further, and perhaps most importantly,
"[t]hese representatives interact[ed] with employee committeemembers under the rules of consensus decision-making... 'when all
members of the group, including its leader, are willing to accept a
decision.' ,285 This type of arrangement, the Board concluded, is
decisive evidence of dealing. The Board determined that "[iun circumstances where management members of the committee discuss
proposals with employee members and have the power to reject any

280. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. See also Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21.
284. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894. The Board added:
If the evidence establishes such a pattern or practice ... the element of
dealing is present. However, if there are only isolated instances in which
the group makes ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management response of acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the element of
dealing is missing.
Id.
285. Id. at 895 (quoting from du Pont's Personal Effectiveness Process
handbook).
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proposal, we find that there is 'dealing' within the meaning of section 2(5)."

This conclusion leaves little doubt that the committees at BV
would be held to be "labor organizations" established to "deal with"

management under section 2(5) of the Act. The first and third criteria of the Board's three-part test are easily satisfied at BIW. There

is no question that each committee or team at BIW is an organization in which employees participate. In addition, these committees

discuss issues such as safety, training, recognition and reward programs, and changing health insurance carriers. 2 '

These subjects fall

within the categories of subjects listed in section 2(5). 288 Furthermore, the process of consensus decision-making provided for by the
BIW agreement mirrors that found to establish "dealing" in diu
Pont.
2. Section 8(a)(2): Domination
Once the committee in question is deemed a labor organization

under section 2(5), the question then becomes whether that organization is dominated by the employer either in its formation or administration in violation of section 8(a)(2). At BIV the evidence
appears convincing that management at BIW did not dominate the

formation of the committees. The committee structure provided for
in the agreement was introduced by the union and was accepted by

management through the process of collective bargaining. In addition, the teaming agreement provides that the union, not manage-

ment, will determine the participation of any Local S/6 members.3
Unlike the situation in du Pont, there is little evidence that manage-

ment made the plans for the structuring of the committees, called
the organizational meetings to establish the committees, or made

286. Id. The Board, however, went on to state that the mechanism of majority
decision-making, rather than consensus decision-making, would not necessarily constitute "dealing." The Board stated that "there would be no 'dealing with' management if the committee were governed by majority decision-making, management
representatives were in the minority, and the committee had the power to decide
matters for itself, rather than simply make proposals to management." Id. Such
structure is something BIW should seriously consider if reformation of the committee is required or desired.
287. BIWV AGREE-MENT, supra note 2, at 7.
288. See e.g., United States Postal Service, 302 N.L.R.B. 767,776 (1991) (holding
that the term "wages" does not merely refer to a sum of money given for actual
hours worked but also refers to other forms of compensation and benefits). See E. 1.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.1B. at 894 n.8 (1993).
289. BIV AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 11. See note 188 infra for full text of
teaming agreement.
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as to which unit employees would sit on the
any determinations
290
teams.
The more serious problem confronting the legality of the BIW
teams, however, is the possibility that BIW's management could be
found to be dominating the administration of the committees. In du
Pont the Board concluded that the process of consensus decisionmaking, whereby management ultimately retains veto power over
any action the committee wishes to take, is strong evidence of an
employer's domination of the administration of the committee. 2 9 '
The Board, however, did not conclude that this factor alone was sufficient to find domination. In du Pont the Board also found evidence that a member of management served as committee leader,
that management could change or abolish any of the committees at
will, and that union employees had no independent voice in determining any aspect of the composition, structure, or operation of
these coniittees. 29 The Board concluded that these factors, in addition to the consensus decision-making, "taken together, establish
293
that [du Pont] dominated the administration of the committees.$
Aside from the mechanism of consensus decision-making, however,
none of these additional factors are present at BIW. The BIW
teaming agreement provides that the union must approve the formation of all joint committees and that decisions affecting the joint
team interactions will be arrived at by consensus.2 94 In this regard
the du Pont decision provides some guidance for BIW but does not
answer the question of domination definitively.
3. Section 8(a)(5): BargainingIssues
An issue unique to employee participation committees at unionized firms is the question of whether the employer is bypassing the
union and discussing mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
with employee committee participants in violation of section
8(a)(5). As with the section 8(a)(2) analysis, the Board's decision in
du Pont provides some helpful guidance but does not supply a definitive answer to BIW's concerns. In du Pont the Board was eager to
point out that employees' participation in a safety conference was
not an unlawful bypassing of the union over a mandatory term of
bargaining in violation of section 8(a)(5).295 The Board held that,
290. These were all factors that the Board used to determine that management at
du Pont had dominated formation of the Freon Committee at the du Pont plant. E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 896.
291. Id. at 895-96.

292. Id. at 896.
293. Id.
294. BIW AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 11.
295. In du Pont, the Board affirmed the ruling of the Administrative Law Judge,
but wrote a rather descriptive opinion in order to "add rationale to [the AU's] decision ...

to provide guidance for those seeking to implement lawful cooperative
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regardless of the fact that safety, a mandatory term of bargaining,
was discussed, the safety conferences amounted to no more than
brainstorming sessions and did not constitute any type of dealing or
bargaining with the employer about the issue.2 96
In addition the Board in du Pont placed heavy emphasis on the
fact that the employer had a mechanism in place for keeping bargainable issues out of the discussion. The Board emphasized that
the employer informed participants that the conference was not a
union matter. The employer "made clear to the employees that it
recognized the Union's role and that bargainable issues should be
handled only by the Union., 297 Although the Board was not
"wholly persuaded" that the employer was completely successful in
actually keeping the issues separate, the Board determined that the
employer's "good faith effort to separate out bargainable issues and
the assurances that the Union had the exclusive role as to such issues are further indications that there was no 29
undermining
of the
8
Union's status as the exclusive representative.,
Management and labor at BIW have been very careful to separate
bargainable issues from discussion by the teams and committees.
The teaming agreement specifically provides that "[a]ll mandatory
subjects of bargaining are the exclusive right of Local S/6, and management cannot bypass the Union by unilaterally implementing
changes in subjects of bargaining.... Joint Teams must understand
they cannot discuss mandatory subjects of bargaining unless approved by the Union/Company Oversight Committee." 2 9 In addition, the BIW agreement initially provides that "Bath Iron Works
recognizes the Union as the exclusive representative in respect to all
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and all other conditions
of employment for all employees in job classes in Local S/6." 3 0
These mechanical and procedural safeguards would serve as helpful evidence in a section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice proceeding.
They may not, however, be enough. The court will consider both
what is theoretically provided for in the agreement and what actually happens when the committees meet. In du Pont the Board did
programs between employees and management." E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
311 N.L.R.B. at 893. In determining that the safety conferences did not violate
§ 2(5), the Board observed that:
[T]he safety conferences are a good example of how an employer can involve employees in important matters such as plant safety, without running
afoul of § 8(a)(2) or § 8(a)(5) of the Act. Nothing in the Act prevents an
employer from encouraging its employees to express their ideas and to become more aware of safety problems in their work.
It at 897.
296. Id at 896-97.
297. Id at 896.
298. Id at 897.
299. BPV AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 11-12.
300. Id at 5.
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find that some of the committees had violated section 8(a)(5) by
unlawfully bypassing the union as to mandatory terms of bargaining.

The Board found that the safety and fitness committees dealt with
issues that were identical to those addressed by the union and were

actually successful in bringing about resolutions that the union had
failed to achieve."' Unlike the safety conference that was held to
violate the Act, these committees had the characteristics of bargaining sessions whereby proposals were offered, discussed, and de-

cided. The du Pont committees more accurately reflect and
resemble the structure and purpose of the BIW committees than
does the safety conference at issue in du Pont. The BIW agreement
has provided for procedural safeguards against a section 8(a)(5) vio-

lation, but practice may be far different from theory in this regard.
Many of the topics of discussion delegated to the BIW teams are

clearly mandatory subjects of bargaining. Management must be
very careful to keep the employees informed of the union's status as
exclusive representative of the employees for these matters. In ad-

dition, and perhaps more importantly, the employer must structure
the discussions so they do not resemble actual bargaining
sessions.3 02

4. The Need for Legal Change

NLRA decisions by various courts provide some guidance for
BIW but do not give clear answers to the legal questions surrounding BIW's cooperative effort. What does appear clear, however, is
that the law of the Supreme Court and the Board provide little flexi-

bility for management and labor to cooperate in the workplace. The
First Circuit by contrast has been one court employing the freedom
of choice analysis to accommodate more cooperation.30 3 Any legal
301. For example, the Antiknocks Area Safety Committee was successful in obtaining a new welding shop for a welder who had complained of poor ventilation.
The union's effort to resolve the problem had failed, and the welder instead took his
complaint directly to the committee. Similarly, the Fitness Committee created a recreational area that included picnic tables, a volleyball area, a horseshoe pit, a jogging
track, and sanitary facilities. The union had sought similar facilities in negotiations
with du Pont but had failed. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 897.
302. In addition, no violation of § 8(a)(5) will occur if the union grants employee
team members the authority to discuss mandatory subjects of bargaining with management team members.
303. See NLRB v. Northeastern University, 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979). In this
case, the First Circuit (Coffin, CJ.) held that a labor organization was not dominated
by the employer even though there was evidence that the employer had the unexercised power to appoint members to the organization, had printed and distributed
ballots with paychecks, had paid for the organization's expenses, and that the organization had not negotiated a formal collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1211-12.
In finding no violation of § 8(a)(2), the court held that the legal standard to apply
was a showing of actualdomination. Id. at 1213. After reviewing the case law of the
First Circuit (citing NLRB v. Reed Rolled Thread Die Co., 432 F.2d 70 (1st Cir.
1970)); NLRB v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
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challenge to the cooperative techniques employed at BPNV would be

reviewable by the First Circuit. A traditional freedom of choice
analysis may be inapplicable to the BIV agreement because the
agreement was the result of collective bargaining where the will of
the employees is manifested in the union itself. The First Circuit,

nevertheless, may be willing to interpret the entire Act in fight of
changing industrial realities to accommodate labor-management cooperation. In NLRB v. Northeastern University" 4 Judge Coffin de-

clared that "changing conditions in the labor-management field
seem to have strengthened the case for providing room for cooperative employer-employee arrangements as alternatives to the tradi-

tional adversary model.""3

5

The First Circuit's willingness to

reexamine the Act to accommodate cooperation reflects the need to
reevaluate the adversarial model in labor relations. The Seventh

Circuit's refusal to employ a freedom of choice analysis in the Electromation, Inc. decision, however, may reflect a growing reluctance

on the part of the federal circuit courts to deviate from the standards employed by both the Supreme Court and the Board.30 6 In-

consistencies and lack of uniformity among the circuit courts of
appeal have left many employers and employees unsure of the per-

missibility of cooperation in the workplace. This uncertainty mandates that Congress amend the NLRA to provide guidance and

promote cooperation in the workplace.
The Board's recent decisions in Electromation, Inc. and du Pont

have left unresolved an important question in the section 8(a)(2)
and section 2(5) analysis. In both decisions the Board refused to

require that an employee committee act in a fully representational
capacity to qualify as a labor organization under section 2(5). In du
Pont, for example, the Board found that several of the committees
U.S. 1023 (1970); NLRB v. Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1970);
Coppus Eng. Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957)), the court declared its
standard in conformity with other circuits that have applied a similar test. Id. at
1214 (citing Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied,
423 U.S. 875 (1975); NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968);
Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Post Publication Co., 311 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1962); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d
165 (7th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1954)). The court
recognized "some room for management-employee cooperation short of domination, looking to the subjective realities of domination of employee will and not just
the objective potentialities of organizational structure," and declared that "changing
conditions in the labor-management field seem to have strengthened the case for
providing room for cooperative employer-employee arrangements as alternatives to
the traditional adversary model." NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1213-14.
304. 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979).
305. Id. at 1214.
306. As previously discussed, however, the Electromation, Inc decision was not a
difficult case from a § 8(a)(2) perspective. Unfortunately, it was not the ideal vehicle for the Board or the Seventh Circuit to clarify the law in favor of a more cooperative workplace or to employ a freedom of choice analysis.
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had acted in a representational manner, and therefore the Board

refused to address the question of whether section 2(5) requires the
higher standard. In addition the Board rejected du Pont's contention that any section 2(5) analysis should be based upon a subjective
standard. Du Pont argued that section 2(5) mandates direct affirmative evidence that the non-participating employees believed that
participating employees were representing non-participating employees' interests.3" 7 The Board rejected this assertion but refused

to summarily reject or accept the idea that section 2(5) mandates a
representational aspect to an employee "labor organization."
Although the Board refused to decide the representation issue directly,3" 8 the Board did indicate that the legislative history of the

Act3" 9 and earlier Board decisions310 revealed a recognition of a
representational capacity to section 2(5) labor organizations. 311 As
one commentator has suggested, requiring a representational aspect
to a "labor organization" under section 2(5) would accomplish both

goals inherent in the ban on company unions in section 8(a)(2) and
would comport with the economic theory behind the Act: "that the

company unions that the NLRA sought to prohibit were all sham

representatives or agents of their worker members, 3 12 and that

"groups of employees that do not act in a representative capacity do
not compete with unions for that right, and so do not pose a threat

to the ,process
of labor supply cartelization sanctioned by the
313
NLRA,

This argument is persuasive and would help to ensure the legality
of many employee participation and involvement programs. A better approach, however, would be to address the representation issue
directly in the language of section 8(a)(2). This is the approach cur-

rently under debate in the Congress. The following section discusses this proposal and argues in favor of the currently pending
legislation.
307. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894 n.7.
308. In Electromation, Ina NLRB member Devaney, in his concurring opinion,
concluded that § 2(5) does require a finding that a labor organization act in a representative capacity. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 998-1003. The majority,
however, found that the employee members of the committees in Electromatlon,
Ina had acted in a representative capacity, and therefore it was "unnecessary to the
disposition of this case to determine whether an employee group could ever be
found to constitute a labor organization in the absence of a finding that it acted as a
representative of the other employees." Id. at 994 n.20.
309. Id. at 992-97.
310. The Board pointed to the NLRB's first decision, Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (193.5) and to General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 995.
311. See generally Quality Circles or Company Unions?, supra note 141, at 91115.
312. Id. at 912.
313. Id. at 925.
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5. Pending Legislation
The legal uncertainties of the BV agreement involve the procedures of its implementation rather than the actual formation of its
committees. The committee structure and the teaming agreement
were the result of negotiations between management and labor. In
the BIW scenario there is absolutely no evidence that the employer
unlawfully dominated in the formation of the committees in violation of section 8(a)(2). Unlike BIW, however, the majority of
American workers are not represented by a union. In these nonunion workplaces, cooperative programs and employee participation plans are often implemented unilaterally by management. In
such circumstances there is great potential for a court to find unlawful employer domination in the formation and administration of the
employee committees in violation of section 8(a)(2). Regardless of
an employer's noble intentions and the employees' satisfaction with
the participation plan, the Board and courts have ordered such plans
disestablished.
Recognizing the ambiguities surrounding the legality of cooperative efforts under current labor law, the 104th Congress is actively
reviewing the language and effect of section 8(a)(2). In particular,
H.R. 743, the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995,
would modify section 8(a)(2) to make clear that companies can create labor-management teams to address issues such as productivity,
quality control, safety, and other terms and conditions of employment.3 14 Introduced by Representative Steve Gunderson (R-WI),
the bill was approved on March 7, 1995, by the Employer-Employee
Relations Subcommittee of the House Economic and Educational
Opportunities Committee.3 15 The bill is expected to be considered
by the full committee in the near future. "Approval by the full committee and the House is almost certain, though the legislation's fate
in the Senate is unclear.- 3 16 Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum (RKan.), Chairwoman of the Senate Human Resources Committee,
has introduced a similar measure, S. 295, in the Senate. Labor Sechas recommended that President Clinton
retary Robert B. Reich
317
legislation.
the
veto
314. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see generally Robert Marshall
Wells, Subcommittee Approves Bill on Workplace "Teams," 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. 759
(1995) [hereinafter Subcommittee Approves Bill].
315. Subcommittee Approves Bill, supra note 304, at 759 (The bill approved by
the subcommittee was actually a substitute offered by Rep. Harris Fawell (R-Ill),
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations.).
316. Id.
317. See Court Gifford, House Panel Clears Team Act: Reich Threatens Veto by
Clinton, [1995] Mgmt. Briefing (BNA), Mar. 8, 1995. Labor Secretary Reich, in a
letter to Rep. Harris Fawell (R-Ill), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations, wrote that the administration supports "flexibility and

high-performance workplace practices that promote cooperative labor-management
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H.R. 743 amends section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA to mandate that
only employee committees that act in a representational capacity
may be found invalid because of an employer's unlawful domination
or support. The language of H.R. 743 provides:
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act is
amended by striking the semicolon and inserting the following: ":Providedfurther, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an
employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any
organization or entity of any kind, in which employees participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not
limited to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety
and health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority
to be the exclusive bargainingrepresentative of the employees
or negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agreements
with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining
agreements between the employer and any labor
organization. 31 8
relations." ld. Reich stated, however, that H.R. 743 would "undermine" the existing legal prohibitions against sham or company dominated unions. Under current
law, Reich argued, nothing "prevents employers from setting up employee involvement groups that explore issues of quality, productivity, and efficiency." Id.
318. See H.R. 743, 104th Cong., 1st Sess (1995) (emphasis added to reflect language inserted by Falwell substitute). The official findings and purposes contained
in the bill serve to illuminate the rationale behind the legislation. The findings state:
(a) Findings.-Congress finds that(1) the escalating demands of global competition have compelled an increasing number of employers in the United States to make dramatic
changes in workplace and employer-employee relationships;
(2) such changes involve an enhanced role for the employee in workplace decisionmaking, often referred to as "Employee Involvement", which
has taken many forms, including self-managed work teams, quality-of-worklife, quality circles, and joint labor-management committees;
(3) Employee Involvement programs, which operate successfully in both
unionized and nonunionized settings, have been established by over 80 percent of the largest employers in the United States and exist in an estimated
30,000 workplaces;
(4) in addition to enhancing the productivity and competitiveness of
businesses in the United States, Employee Involvement programs have had
a positive impact on the lives of such employees, better enabling them to
reach their potential in the work force;
(5) recognizing that foreign competitors have successfully utilized Employee Involvement techniques, the Congress has consistently joined business, labor and academic leaders in encouraging and recognizing successful
Employee Involvement programs in the workplace through such incentives
as the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award;
(6) employers who have instituted legitimate Employee Involvement
programs have not done so to interfere with the collective bargaining rights
guaranteed by the labor laws, as was the case in the 1930's when employers
established deceptive sham "company unions" to avoid unionization; and
(7) Employee Involvement is currently threatened by legal interpretations of the prohibition against employer-dominated "company unions."
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In requiring that an employee committee serve in a representational
capacity, H.R. 743 is a pragmatic and fair clarification of the purpose of section 8(a)(2). Section 8(a)(2) was designed to ensure that
employers could not establish sham unions that would compete with
outside unions for the representation of the employees. The language of H.R. 743 addresses this concern by prohibiting an employer's support or domination of entities that seek to represent
employees or that negotiate, enter into, or amend collective bargaining agreements. The bill recognizes three very important points: 1)
that there are certain spheres of interest that are of mutual concern
to both the employer and employee; 2) that employee participation
plans serve the interests of both parties; and 3) that these committees cannot compete with outside unions for representation status.
There should be no reason to prohibit management and labor from
discussing issues of mutual concern, as long as the committee does
not attempt to represent the workers as a bargaining agent for their
collective interests. In short, the amendment preserves the employees' right to choose outside representation by ensuring that employer-employee committees do not compete for representative
status.
Many who oppose the bill have argued that it would leave employees vulnerable to employer abuses. In particular they argue
that the bill would "give employers the exclusive authority to select
and appoint members of workplace teams, even if workers belonged
to unions. "319 Representative Matthew G. Martinez (D-Calf.),
ranking Democrat on the House Employer-Employee Relations
Subcommittee, feared that the change in the law would "foment dictatorial practices in the workplace" and would severely undermine
unions where they do exist in the workplace. 3" This complaint,
however, fails to take into account the protections simultaneously
afforded to employees under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer"
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. 32I H.R. 743 prohibits
coercion and domination, but it encourages cooperation. Under the
amended language of section 8(a)(2), "[L]abor and management
(b) Purposes.-The purpose of this Act is(1) to protect legitimate Employee Involvement programs against governmental interference;
(2) to preserve existing protections against deceptive, coercive employer
practices; and
(3)to allow legitimate Employee Involvement programs, in which workers may discuss issues involving terms and conditions of employment, to
continue to evolve and proliferate.

Id. (emphasis added to reflect language inserted by the Falwell substitute).
319. Subcommittee Approves Bill, supra note 304, at 759.
320. Id.
321. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
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will be free to cooperate, but oppressive employers will not be able
to dominate." 3 Likewise, section 8(a)(5) still guarantees that the
employer cannot bypass the union and bargain over issues that are
traditionally left to the union.3 "3 The enforcement of this provision,
combined with the safeguards provided for in H.R. 743, will ensure
that employee committees will not compete with or usurp the authority granted to traditional labor unions.
Under H.R. 743 a labor organization would still be defined as one
that "deals with" an employer over the statutory issues contained in
section 2(5). Maintaining this lower level of contact between employer and employee will enable the NLRB and the courts greater
authority and discretion when scrutinizing employee participation
plans. Under the new approach of H.R. 743, it is legal for an employer to assist in the formation of a labor organization as long as
that labor organization does not bargain with or seek to be the exclusive representative of the employees. In addition H.R. 743 will
allow employees and employers to discuss issues of mutual concern
such as productivity, efficiency, safety, and other terms and conditions of employment. There will be no violation of section 8(a)(2)
where the element of bargaining or representation is missing. Maintaining the lower level "dealing with" definition contained in section
2(5), however, will allow the Board and courts more authority to
scrutinize the plans. The judicial inquiry will be fact-specific and
will guard against employer abuses. The judicial inquiry will resemble that employed by the freedom of choice analysts. The Board
and the courts can guard against employer domination while ensuring the employees' freedom to choose outside representation. The
judicial standard will be actual domination of an organization developed by an employer to usurp the role of a traditional union. This
standard guards against employer abuses and at the same time
achieves the goals inherent in the ban of company unions.
The need for greater labor-management cooperation is clear.
Employers and employees have expressed their interest and desire
for a more cooperative and less adversarial workplace. American
labor law should not serve as an impediment to this mutually beneficial endeavor. As Representative Gunderson stated on the floor of
the House:
[O]ne of the most important issues.., is how we as a nation
can develop and maintain a competitive, motivated, and involved workforce. This is particularly important today because we now live and compete in the global market. As the
global market has expanded, successful American companies
of all types have learned that cooperation between employees
322. Rethinking the Adversarial Model, supra note 8, at 2041 (arguing for either
clarification of or repeal of § 8(a)(2)).
323. See, eg., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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and managers is vital to staying competitive both domestically
and internationally.
Unfortunately, the employee involvement programs across
the country are legally threatened. Under the National Labor
Relations Act, employee involvement programs have been
disbanded because of inconsistencies between the purposes of
the act when written, and the realities of the modern workplace ....
Through [employee] involvement programs, employees
voice their opinions in the decisionmaking process and therefore have a greater stake in the success or failure of the company. Likewise, managers receive vital information from the
people who have the most knowledge about detailed workplace operations-the employees. These programs often drive
decisionmaking down to the lowest level possible and open up
the flow of information in the workplace, creating much more
cooperative atmosphere ....
America's greatest economic challenges will not be overcome in Washington. They will be met and overcome in
American workplaces by the creativity of American workers
Our task must be to nurture that creativity, not
and managers.
32
stifle it.

4

Congress must ensure that our labor laws adapt to economic and
industrial realities. Amendment of section 8(a)(2) is a good start,
but more must be done. NLRA definitions of supervisors and managers must be amended so that workers feel free to participate in
company decision-making without fears of losing the protections afforded by the NLRA. As a nation we must view our labor laws in
terms of a more educated workforce that desires a more involved
role in the operations of the enterprise. The paternalistic assumptions of the NLRA must give way to the realities of a changing
American labor market. It is time to recognize that the battles of
the past must yield to a more cooperative future.
Traditional labor unions must continue to play an important role
in our society. Likewise, employees must continue to be guaranteed
the right to choose an outside labor organization if that is what they
desire. As the AFL-CIO principles outline, the role of a union in
the workplace must also change. Unions must alter their mindset to
embrace cooperation rather than conflict. Labor unions must act
not only as an asset and friend of the employees but also as an asset
to the company. In order to regain the competitive edge, the American workplace must change. This change must come from all the
parties involved. Labor law should foster this cooperation rather
than impede it.
324. See 141 CONG. REc. E220, E220-21, (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Gunderson introducing the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act).
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CONCLUSION

Throughout the nation American businesses and workers are real-

izing that to remain competitive and to protect jobs requires a new
era in labor-management cooperation. Cooperative programs and
employee participation plans are being employed throughout the
country in many different forms. Their legality, however, is uncer-

tain under current labor law.3 ' The framework for collective bargaining established by the NLRA does not require that the parties

treat one another as adversaries, but the result of several provisions
of the Act has been to maintain a strict separation between the par-

ties. Under current labor law the parties may cooperate, but the law
allows the parties to go only so far. In E. . du Pont the Board deter-

mined several permissible techniques of cooperation. These included "brainstorming" groups, information sharing committees,
and "suggestion box[es]. '"3 6 These techniques may be helpful in the
workplace, but they are limited in scope and effect. Where employ-

ees desire more input in the workplace and employers are willing to
share their decision-making authority, the law should allow the parties to pursue these goals.
President Clinton traveled to Bath, Maine, last Labor Day to tell

the nation of a success story in American labor relations. The BIW
agreement represents a genuine effort between management and labor, once bitter rivals, to cooperate to the mutual benefit of each

side. The BIW agreement extends the concept of cooperation to its
maximum. The collective bargaining agreement makes management and labor joint partners in a single venture. The agreement,
and the processes of collective bargaining employed, exemplify what
is possible for businesses throughout America. The agreement,
325. The ambiguities in the law have actually restrained existing participation
plans from pursuing more cooperative techniques. For example, a non-management
employee who participated in a cooperative team at his workplace stated that the
uncertainties in the law had a restraining effect upon members of his team. The
worker stated, "We didn't have an opportunity to evolve as far as we could have."
Subcommittee Approves Bill, supra note 304, at 759. The employee and his team
members, who are not unionized, have worked with management on such issues as
production and safety. But the employer "has not formed worker-management
committees to discuss issues such as medical benefits or the design of company
uniforms out of fear that it would be considered a violation of the NLRA." Id.
326. See 311 N.L.R.B. at 894. In each of these examples the Board determined
that the element of "dealing" was not present and therefor the cooperative techniques did not qualify as "labor organizations" under § 2(5). For example, the
Board stated that
a "brainstorming" group is not ordinarily engaged in dealing. The purpose
of such a group is simply to develop a whole host of ideas. Management
may glean some ideas from this process, and indeed may adopt some of
them. If the group makes no proposals, the "brainstorming" session is not
dealing and is therefore not a labor organization.
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however, also exemplifies the need for statutory change to ensure
that cooperative efforts are able to stand up to legal scrutiny. The
law should foster labor-management cooperation, rather than impede or prohibit its undertaking.
The BIW collective bargaining agreement evidences the notion
that the model of collective bargaining need not be an adversarial
undertaking. The BIW experience exemplifies what is possible
when the two sides extend their relationship beyond the traditional
zero-sum game. American businesses with unionized workers
should look to the BIW agreement and to the experiences of other
businesses to learn what is possible when the union is made a partner and treated as an asset rather than an inherent adversary. For
American businesses that have feared a union presence in their
shop, the BIW experience should serve to ameliorate those insecurities. A change in attitude and mindset is required from each side.
The labor-management relationship is only adversarial to the extent
the two sides elect to treat one another in that way.
The BIW experience, however exemplary, unfortunately may be
of limited use in analyzing workplace cooperation because, unlike
BIW, the majority of the American workforce has chosen not to be
represented by a traditional union. Currently only twenty percent
of the workforce is represented by an outside union. The BIW
agreement can serve as a national model for cooperation only in
unionized workplaces. The law, however, should encourage cooperation regardless of a union's presence. American workers must be
secure in their right to join a union and engage in concerted activities if that is what they desire. Likewise, employees should be able
to choose between a traditional adversarial workplace or a more cooperative venture. If the latter is what they desire, American labor
law should encourage its undertaking.
President Clinton hailed the BIW agreement as a national model
for workplace cooperation. The irony of his visit, however, is that
under current labor law legal uncertainties surround implementation of that agreement. These uncertainties may lead to adverse
consequences for the workers involved. Furthermore, in the majority of workplaces across America, i.e., those without a union presence, the cooperative techniques employed at BIW would face even
greater legal uncertainty. The BIW agreement, while representing a
true achievement in labor relations, also exemplifies the need to
reevaluate the basic premises of the NLRA. The adversarial model
of labor relations is ill-suited to deal with today's changing American labor market and globally competitive economy. American labor law must adapt to economic realities. The well-being of our
nation's workforce and economic competitiveness is at stake.
Jonathan B. Goldin

